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 Harmonizing Conversion and the 
Means Test in Bankruptcy 
Garrett Pratt, Daniel Graves & Michelle Arnopol Cecil* 
ABSTRACT 
Determining whether the means test applies in cases converted from Chapter 13 to 
Chapter 7 has divided courts across the United States and has even caused bank-
ruptcy judges within the same district court to disagree. In the nearly 15 years since 
the enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
(“BAPCPA”), a majority of courts have held that the means test applies in converted 
cases. However, a considerable minority view has emerged, which virtually all 
scholarship on the issue has adopted. Although both the majority and minority 
views cause interpretive problems, this article argues that the means test should ap-
ply in cases converted from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7. This view promotes a better 
reading of § 707(b) and the Bankruptcy Code in general and prevents debtors from 
manipulating the bankruptcy system by filing under Chapter 13 and then converting 
to Chapter 7 to avoid the means test. Additionally, this article also provides lan-
guage that Congress should adopt in amending the Bankruptcy Code to codify the 













                                                          
* Garrett Pratt is a term law clerk to United States Bankruptcy Judge Brian T. Fenimore in the Western 
District of Missouri. B.A., University of Missouri-Columbia; J.D., University of Missouri School of 
Law, LL.M. in Taxation, University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law. As of the publication of 
this article, Garrett did not have the subject matter of this article come before him during his clerkship 
and did not consult with any judge from the Western District of Missouri about this article. 
 
Daniel Graves is an Associate Attorney, Polsinelli PC. B.A., Southeast Missouri State University; J.D., 
magna cum laude, University of Missouri School of Law. 
 
Michelle Arnopol Cecil is a Curators’ Distinguished Teaching Professor and William H. Pittman Pro-
fessor of Law, University of Missouri School of Law. B.A., J.D., magna cum laude, University of Illi-
nois. I would like to thank Robert Herz and Cory Lee for their invaluable research assistance. 
1
Pratt et al.: Harmonizing Conversion and the Means Test in Bankruptcy
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2019
Iss. 1] Pratt, Graves & Cecil: Harmonizing Conversion 37 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Bankruptcy Code1 provides a fresh start to honest debtors who find them-
selves unable to pay their debts because of unfortunate circumstances.2 Yet, bank-
ruptcy cases are replete with debtors behaving badly. Some debtors lie to the court 
about their assets and liabilities,3 while others file multiple bankruptcy cases to post-
pone inevitable foreclosure sales.4 While the Bankruptcy Code discourages some 
bad debtor behavior,5 it is often left to the bankruptcy courts to determine whether 
other debtor behavior is within the bounds of the Bankruptcy Code or, instead, con-
stitutes an abuse of the bankruptcy process. This article explores one such issue: the 
conversion of a case from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7. 
One of the first strategic decisions that an individual filing for bankruptcy must 
make is whether to file for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 76 or Chapter 137 
of the Bankruptcy Code.8 Under Chapter 7, a debtor receives an unconditional dis-
charge of his or her personal liability for most debts by turning over nonexempt 
assets to a bankruptcy trustee, who liquidates those assets and distributes the pro-
ceeds to creditors.9 Conversely, in Chapter 13, a debtor’s discharge is conditioned 
upon repaying a portion of his or her debts over three to five years.10 Chapter 13 
allows debtors to retain nonexempt assets.11 
Since the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978,12 some members of Con-
gress have been concerned that individual debtors with sufficient disposable income 
to repay at least some of their unsecured debts choose to file under Chapter 7 to 
receive a quick discharge even though they have some ability to repay those debts 
under Chapter 13.13 It is widely believed that credit card companies and banks 
                                                          
 1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 (2012). 
 2. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1991) (the Bankruptcy Code provides debtors a fresh 
start by establishing “a procedure by which certain insolvent debtors can reorder their affairs, make peace 
with their creditors, and enjoy ‘a new opportunity in life with a clear field for future effort, unhampered 
by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.’” (citing Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 
244 (1934)). Grogan also states that a fresh start is an opportunity limited only to honest but unfortunate 
debtors. Id. (citing Hunt, 292 U.S. at 244). 
 3. United States v. Edwards, 595 F.3d 1004, 1009 (9th Cir. 2010) (debtor failed to disclose $3 million 
criminal restitution judgment against him and failed to disclose over $40,000 in nonexempt assets). 
 4. Casse v. Key Bank Nat’l Ass’n (In re Casse), 198 F.3d 327, 329 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 5. If debtors behave badly during the course of their bankruptcy cases, the court may determine that 
some or all of their debts are non-dischargeable. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2), (a)(5), 727(a) (2012). 
Debtors may also be subject to criminal prosecution for their misconduct in bankruptcy. 18 U.S.C. § 157 
(2012). 
 6. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701–784 (2012). 
 7. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1330 (2012). 
 8. Individual debtors may also file under Chapter 11 or Chapter 12. Generally, most individuals do 
not file under Chapter 11 because of its expense unless they are ineligible for Chapters 7 and 13 because 
their secured or unsecured debt exceed certain statutory thresholds and they are trying to avoid liquidat-
ing their non-exempt assets. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-8); see generally 
11 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1174 (2012). An individual must be a family farmer or family fisherman to file under 
Chapter 12. 11 U.S.C. § 109(f). 
 9. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31(I), at 10 (2005); 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (2012). 
 10. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(4) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-8). 
 11. Harris v. Viegelahn, 135 S. Ct. 1829, 1835 (2015) (“A wholly voluntary alternative to Chapter 7, 
Chapter 13 allows a debtor to retain his property if he proposes, and gains court confirmation of, a plan 
to repay his debts over a three- to five-year period.” (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 1306(b), 1322, 1327(b)). 
 12. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978). 
 13. See infra notes 30–42 and accompanying text. 
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heavily lobbied Congress to include more stringent anti-abuse provisions in the 
Bankruptcy Code, forcing can-pay debtors to file for Chapter 13 rather than Chapter 
7.14 After a decade of lobbying,15 their efforts paid off; President George W. Bush 
signed the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
(“BAPCPA”) into law in 2005.16 
The heart of BAPCPA is Bankruptcy Code § 707(b)(2), colloquially known as 
“the means test.”17 The goal of the means test is to determine if a debtor’s Chapter 
7 case is an abuse of the Bankruptcy Code.18 The means test itself is a multi-step 
determination that begins with a calculation of a debtor’s monthly disposable in-
come. The means test raises a rebuttable presumption that a debtor’s Chapter 7 case 
is an abuse of the bankruptcy process if his or her disposable income exceeds a 
certain requisite threshold.19 
While the means test is complex,20 its application is straightforward in cases 
originally filed under Chapter 7. However, courts disagree on whether the means 
test applies in cases where the debtor originally filed under Chapter 13 and subse-
quently converts to Chapter 7.21 Bankruptcy judges within the same district have 
disagreed with one another across the United States.22 In the nearly 15 years since 
BAPCPA’s enactment, a majority of courts addressing the issue have determined 
that the means test applies in converted cases.23 However, a considerable number 
of courts have held the means test is not applicable in cases converted from Chapter 
13 to Chapter 7.24 Courts adopting both views have recognized that adopting either 
                                                          
 14. Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweat Box” of Credit Card Debt, 2007 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 375, 380 (2007). 
 15. Id. at 383. 
 16. Associated Press, Bush Signs Tougher Bankruptcy Bill into Law, NBC NEWS (Apr. 20, 2005, 4:58 
PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/7575010/ns/business-personal_finance/t/bush-signs-tougher-bank-
ruptcy-bill-law/#.XLU_i-hKhPY. 
 17. ELIZABETH WARREN ET AL., THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 253 (7th ed. 2014). 
 18. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-8). 
 19. See generally id. 
 20. WARREN ET AL., supra note 17, at 257. 
 21. See infra notes 126–298 and accompanying text. 
 22. Compare In re St. Jean, 515 B.R. 864, 865 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012) (means test applies), with In 
re Thoemke, 2014 WL 443890, at *1 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Feb. 4, 2014) (means test does not apply); 
compare In re Hayes, 2015 WL 236275, at *5 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 2015) (means test applies), 
with In re Pate, 2012 WL 6737814, at *3 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Dec. 28, 2012) (means test does not apply); 
compare In re Reece, 498 B.R. 72, 74 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2013) (means test applies), with In re Dudley, 
405 B.R. 790, 801 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2009) (means test does not apply). 
 23. Pollitzer v. Gebhardt, 860 F.3d 1334, 1336 (11th Cir. 2017); Justice v. Advanced Control Solu-
tions, Inc., 2008 WL 4368668, at *5 (W.D. Ark. Sep. 22, 2008), aff’d, 639 F.3d 838, 840–41 (8th Cir. 
2011) (not an abuse of discretion to order conversion of case back to Chapter 13 after debtor failed to 
rebut the presumption of abuse under § 707(b)); In re Chapman, 447 B.R. 250, 250 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 
2011); In re Burgher, 539 B.R. 868, 877 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2015); In re Hayes, 2015 WL 236275, at *5; 
In re Croft, 539 B.R. 122, 132 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2015); In re Summerville, 515 B.R. 651, 652 (Bankr. 
M.D. Fla. 2014); In re Davis, 489 B.R. 478, 479 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2013); In re Reece, 498 B.R. at 74; In 
re St. Jean, 515 B.R. at 865; In re Lassiter, 2011 WL 2039363, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Va. May 24, 2011); 
In re Willis, 408 B.R. 803, 804 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2009); In re Perfetto, 361 B.R. 27, 28 (Bankr. D.R.I. 
2007); In re Kellett, 379 B.R. 332, 339 (Bankr. D. Or. 2007); In re Kerr, 2007 WL 21192921, at *4 
(Bankr. W.D. Wash. July 18, 2007). 
 24. In re Thoemke, 2014 WL 443890, at *1; In re Pate, 2012 WL 6737814, at *4; In re Layton, 480 
B.R. 392, 393–94 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012); In re Dudley, 405 B.R. at 801; In re Guarin, 2009 WL 
4500476, at *1 (Bankr. D. Mass. Dec. 3, 2009); In re Miller, 381 B.R. 736, 741 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 
2008); In re Ryder, 2008 WL 3845246, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2008); In re Fox, 370 B.R. 639, 
648 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007). 
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view inevitably creates contradictions between provisions of the Bankruptcy Code 
itself or with the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.25 Indeed, the first court 
of appeals to consider the issue acknowledged that both views are “defensible po-
sitions.”26 Unlike the courts, however, academic scholarship on the issue nearly 
uniformly argues that the means test should not apply in converted cases.27 If the 
means test does not apply in converted cases, debtors could avoid the means test by 
filing their bankruptcy cases under Chapter 13 and immediately converting to Chap-
ter 7, even though they have sufficient income to repay at least some of their debts. 
For example, one court holding that the means test did not apply in a converted case 
allowed debtors with $2,000 of monthly disposable income to quickly convert from 
Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 and avoid the means test.28 The court’s holding permitted 
the debtors to avoid the repayment of nearly $120,000 of debt that they would have 
been required to repay in a Chapter 13 proceeding.29 
To avoid outcomes like the one described above, this article argues that the 
means test should apply in converted cases. While imperfect, this position promotes 
a better reading of § 707(b) and avoids creating a loophole by which debtors with 
sufficient disposable income can avoid the means test by initially filing under Chap-
ter 13 and then immediately converting to Chapter 7. This article proposes an 
amendment to the Bankruptcy Code to resolve this issue by statute. 
Part II briefly summarizes the legislative history of § 707(b), as well as the 
mechanics of the means test. It also explores the Bankruptcy Code’s provisions de-
tailing the effect of conversion on a debtor’s case. Part III summarizes the most 
prominent cases on both sides of this vexing issue, focusing on the policy justifica-
tions for both positions. Finally, Part IV argues that the means test should apply in 
converted cases and provides statutory language that Congress should use to amend 
the Bankruptcy Code to codify this position. This article concludes that congres-
sional adoption of this statutory amendment will bring the Bankruptcy Code one 
step closer to achieving its goals of providing honest debtors a fresh start after bank-
ruptcy, while preventing other debtors from behaving badly by abusing the bank-
ruptcy process. 
II. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 
This section outlines § 707(b)’s legislative history and describes the mechanics 
of the means test. It then discusses the effect of conversion on a debtor’s case and 
analyzes Congress’s intent in providing for conversion from Chapter 13 to Chapter 
7. 
                                                          
 25. In re Layton, 480 B.R. at 393–94 (“Both positions cite anomalies within the Bankruptcy Code and 
the accompanying Rules that would occur if the opposite view were to prevail. Unfortunately, these 
anomalies are not exclusive to a particular view and are readily existent regardless of the position the 
Court takes.”). 
 26. Pollitzer, 860 F.3d at 1338. 
 27. G. Eric Brunstad Jr., The Inapplicability of “Means Testing” to Cases Converted to Chapter 7, 
24-NOV AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1, 58 (2005); Kathleen Murphy & Justin H. Dion, “Means Test” or “Just 
a Mean Test”: An Examination of the Requirement that Converted Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Debtors Com-
ply with Amended Section 707(b), 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 413, 419 (2008). 
 28. Dudley, 405 B.R. at 792, 801. 
 29. Id. 
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A. Legislative History of § 707(b) 
Under the 1978 Bankruptcy Act, a court could dismiss a Chapter 7 case “for 
cause.”30 Cause included a debtor’s unreasonable delay in paying creditors or non-
payment of statutory fees or charges.31 In 1984, Congress expanded a court’s au-
thority to dismiss Chapter 7 cases by also allowing a finding of substantial abuse.32 
Codified in § 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress added the substantial abuse 
requirement to ensure that debtors holding primarily consumer debt did not abuse 
the use of Chapter 7.33 Congress intended to respond “to concerns that some debtors 
who could easily pay their creditors might resort to [C]hapter 7 to avoid their obli-
gations.”34 Then, in 1986, Congress again expanded § 707(b) to allow the United 
States Trustee to move for dismissal for substantial abuse.35 
Over the years, credit card companies and banks—dissatisfied with the Code’s 
attempts to curb debtor abuse—heavily lobbied Congress to enact even tougher 
anti-abuse provisions.36 Ultimately, in 2005, Congress comprehensively overhauled 
the bankruptcy system by enacting BAPCPA.37 BAPCPA’s supporters argued that 
bankruptcy claims had skyrocketed since Congress’s last major overhaul of the 
Bankruptcy Code in 1978.38 They praised BAPCPA, arguing that it would reduce 
debtor abuse of the system.39 Congress drafted BAPCPA specifically to prevent 
debtors who are able to repay their creditors, at least in part, from using Chapter 7.40 
                                                          
 30. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2606 (1978); see also H.R. 
REP. NO. 109-31(I), at 11 (2005). 
 31. § 707, 92 Stat. at 2606. 
 32. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, 
335 (1984). The 1984 amendment did not define what constituted substantial abuse, but provided that 
there was a “presumption in favor of granting the relief requested by the debtor.” Id. 
 33. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31(I), at 11–12 (quoting 6 LAWRENCE P. KING ET AL., COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY § 707.LH[2], at 707–30 (15th ed. rev. 2002)). 
 34. Id. at 12 (quoting 6 LAWRENCE P. KING ET AL., COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 707.04 (15th ed. rev. 
2002)). 
 35. Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. 
No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088, 3101 (1986). 
 36. Mann, supra note 14. 
 37. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005). 
 38. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S2459 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“We all 
know how bankruptcy claims have skyrocketed since the last major bankruptcy reform bill in 1978.”); 
151 CONG. REC. S1813 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Frist) (“Personal bankruptcies are 
skyrocketing . . . .”); 151 CONG. REC. S1834 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Akaka) (stating 
that 287,570 consumers filed for bankruptcy in 1980, while approximately 1.2 million consumers filed 
for bankruptcy in just the first nine months of 2004); 151 CONG. REC. E704 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2005) 
(statement of Rep. Moore) (“Bankruptcy filings have increased by 70[%] over the last decade, and last 
year alone Americans filed over 1.6 million consumer bankruptcy petitions”). 
 39. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31(I), at 2. 
 40. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S2459 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“We all 
know about the abuses of the system . . . The legislation . . . will put a stop to abusive practices . . . [and] 
reduce the number of fraudulent and abusive filings.”); 151 CONG. REC. S1813–14 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 
2005) (statement of Sen. Frist) (“[W]ealthy debtors are walking away from debts that they have the 
ability to repay. . . Opportunistic debtors who have the means to repay use the law to evade personal 
responsibility. . . [T]he FBI estimates that at least 10 percent of all filings involve fraud of some type.”); 
151 CONG. REC. E704 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2005) (statement of Rep. Moore) (“[The bill] is a serious, good 
faith effort to reform our bankruptcy laws and reduce the worst abuses in the consumer bankruptcy sys-
tem.”); 151 CONG. REC. E737 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2005) (statement of Rep. Tiahrt) (“The bill . . . [will] 
make it more difficult for those who use bankruptcy as a tool for fraud to cheat their way out of debt . . 
. [N]umerous studies have shown many bankruptcy debtors are able to repay a significant portion of 
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BAPCPA reduced the abuse standard from “substantial abuse” to “abuse” and 
expanded the list of parties that could file a motion for dismissal under § 707(b) to 
include the Chapter 7 trustee, the bankruptcy administrator, and any party in inter-
est.41 Congress also enacted § 707(b)(2), which codified the means test.42 The me-
chanics of the means test and the legislative history of § 707(b) are discussed below. 
B. The Mechanics of the Means Test 
Congress intended that the means test—the heart of BAPCPA’s consumer 
bankruptcy reform measures—ensure that “debtors repay creditors the maximum 
they can afford.”43 Included within the general abuse provisions of Chapter 7,44 
which collectively allow a court to dismiss a case if it determines that granting relief 
to the debtor would be an abuse of the bankruptcy system.45 The means test employs 
a mechanical series of calculations to determine whether a debtor46 has the ability 
to repay his or her unsecured creditors, at least partially.47 
If after applying the means test the debtor has sufficient income to repay unse-
cured creditors, a nearly irrebuttable presumption arises that allowing the debtor to 
receive a Chapter 7 discharge would constitute abuse.48 The debtor may  rebut the 
presumption only by demonstrating special circumstances, such as a serious medi-
cal condition or a call or order to active duty in the armed forces, to the extent such 
special circumstances justify additional expenses or adjustments of current monthly 
income for which there is no reasonable alternative.49 The court may then either 
dismiss the case or, with the debtor’s consent, convert it to a Chapter 11 or Chapter 
13 case.50 The complex mechanics of the means test are outlined below. 
                                                          
their debts.”). See also H.R. REP. No. 109-31(I), at 2 (“[BAPCPA] includes provisions intended to deter 
serial and abusive bankruptcy filings”). 
 41. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-8). 
 42. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2). 
 43. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31(I), at 2. 
 44. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 707. 
 45. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 707(a), (b)(1). 
 46. These abuse provisions, including the means test, apply only to individual debtors with primarily 
consumer debts. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1) (“The court . . . may dismiss a case filed by an individual debtor 
under this chapter whose debts are primarily consumer debts, or, with the debtor’s consent, convert such 
a case to a case under chapter 11 or 13 of this title, if it finds that the granting of relief would be an abuse 
of the provisions of this chapter.”). Consumer debts are defined as those “incurred by an individual 
primarily for a personal, family, or household purpose.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(8) (2012). 
 47. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2). 
 48. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i) (“In considering under paragraph (1) whether the granting of relief 
would be an abuse of the provisions of this chapter, the court shall presume abuse exists if the debtor’s 
current monthly income” meets the requirements of the means test.) (emphasis added). A presumption 
of abuse under the means test can be rebutted only under narrowly defined “special circumstances.” 11 
U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B). 
 49. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i). 
 50. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1). Broadly speaking, Chapter 11 allows certain debtors, most commonly busi-
nesses, to restructure their debts. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1174 (2012). Chapter 13 allows cer-
tain debtors to enter into a repayment schedule of three to five years, requiring the debtor to repay a 
portion of his or her debts before receiving a discharge of most remaining obligations. See generally 11 
U.S.C. §§ 1301–1330 (2012). Section 1328(a) provides a complete list of non-dischargeable debts under 
Chapter 13. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1328(a)(1)–(4) (2012). 
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i. Calculating Current Monthly Income 
An individual Chapter 7 debtor51 completes Form 122A-152 to determine 
whether his or her “current monthly income” is above or below the median income 
in the debtor’s state of residence.53 The debtor’s current monthly income is the 
debtor’s total income, including non-taxable income, received from virtually any 
source54 during the six months immediately preceding the petition date, divided by 
six.55 The court then takes the debtor’s current monthly income, adds the current 
monthly income of the debtor’s non-filing spouse,56 and multiplies the total by 12 
to determine the debtor’s yearly income.57 If the debtor’s yearly income is equal to 
or less than the median yearly family income in the debtor’s state of residence for a 
family of the same size, the presumption of abuse does not arise.58 However, if the 
debtor’s yearly income is above the median, the means test requires the debtor to 
complete Form 122A-259 to determine whether the presumption of abuse arises. 
Form 122A-2 requires the debtor to compare his or her monthly income to his or 
her total allowed monthly expenses.60 
ii. Calculating Total Allowed Monthly Expenses 
The next step under the means test for an above-median income debtor is to 
calculate whether the debtor will have enough money over the next five years to 
repay his or her non-priority, unsecured creditors a certain minimum amount of 
money.61 Under the means test, a debtor is deemed to be able to repay his or her 
creditors the difference between the debtor’s current monthly income and his or her 
                                                          
 51. Some debtors do not have to file Form 122A-1. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(D) (listing certain 
disabled veterans, active duty military, or reservists). 
 52. Means Testing, UNITED STATES DEPT. OF JUSTICE/UNITED STATES TRUSTEE PROGRAM, 
https://www.justice.gov/ust/means-testing (last visited Mar. 5, 2019) [hereinafter Means Testing]. 
 53. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(7). 
 54. The only sources of income excluded from this calculation are benefits received under the Social 
Security Act and certain payments to victims of war crimes, crimes against humanity, or terrorism. 11 
U.S.C. §§ 101(10A)–(B) (2012). 
 55. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A). If a debtor does not file the schedule of current income required by 11 
U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(ii), the last date of the six-month income calculation window instead becomes the 
date the court determines the debtor’s current income. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A)(A)(ii). 
 56. Debtors do not have to include a non-filing spouse’s income if they file an affidavit certifying that 
they and their spouse are legally separated or are otherwise living apart, and they provide an estimate of 
any amount of cash received from their spouse that is part of their current monthly income. 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 707(b)(7)(B)(i)–(iii). 
 57. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(7)(A). 
 58. Id. (“No judge, United States trustee . . . , trustee, or other party in interest may file a motion under 
paragraph (2) if the current monthly income of the debtor . . . and the debtor’s spouse combined, as of 
the date of the order for relief when multiplied by 12, is equal to or less than” the median family income 
of the applicable State for a household of the same size.). For a list of state-by-state median family 
incomes effective for bankruptcy cases filed on or after November 1, 2018, see CENSUS BUREAU 
MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME BY FAMILY SIZE, https://www.jus-
tice.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/20181101/bci_data/median_income_table.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2019). 
 59. U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT, INSTRUCTIONS BANKRUPTCY FORMS FOR INDIVIDUALS (2019), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/instructions_individuals.pdf. 
 60. 11 U.S.C. §707(b)(2)(A)(ii). 
 61. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i). 
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“total allowed monthly expenses.”62 There are five categories of allowed monthly 
expenses, as outlined in detail below. 
The first set of allowed expenses cover some of a debtor’s basic necessities. 
Using the Internal Revenue Service’s (“the Service”) National Standards,63 the 
court calculates a set dollar amount for food, housekeeping supplies, apparel, per-
sonal care products and services, and miscellaneous expenses based on the debtor’s 
household size.64 The court must use the Service-specified amounts regardless of 
whether the debtor’s actual expenses in these categories are higher or lower than 
the Service’s National Standards.65 The court must also allow for any of the Ser-
vice’s Other Necessary Expenses that the Service has issued for the debtor’s geo-
graphic area of residence, but these expenses are limited to the debtor’s actual 
monthly outlays.66 Finally, the court must include the debtor’s reasonably necessary 
expenses for health insurance, disability insurance, health savings accounts, and 
certain family safety expenses.67 
The second set of allowed monthly expenses is governed by a series of  Local 
Standards that the Service issues, covering the debtor’s costs for housing, utilities, 
and transportation.68 The Service establishes housing amounts by county within 
each state, which include the debtor’s mortgage or rent payments, property taxes, 
insurance, maintenance, repairs, and utilities.69 The transportation amounts include 
vehicle loans or lease payments as well as operating expenses, including gas and 
insurance.70 The Service breaks out operating expense amounts by region with cer-
tain major metropolitan areas afforded higher expenses,71 while the ownership ex-
pense amounts are the same throughout the country.72 Courts have been hopelessly 
                                                          
 62. 11 U.S.C. §§ 707(b)(2)(A)(i)–(iv). 
 63. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I). IRS NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR ALLOWABLE LIVING EXPENSES, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/20181101/bci_data/national_ex-
pense_standards.htm [hereinafter NATIONAL EXPENSE STANDARDS]. These standards are adjusted peri-
odically and vary according to family size. Id. 
 64. NATIONAL EXPENSE STANDARDS, supra note 63. The court also may allow an additional expense 
amount for food and clothing, up to five percent of the applicable National Standard, if the debtor’s 
actual expenses in that category exceed the National Standard and the debtor can prove those expenses 
are reasonable and necessary. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(V) (“In addition, if it is demonstrated that it 
is reasonable and necessary, the debtor’s monthly expenses may also include an additional allowance 
for food and clothing of up to 5 percent of the food and clothing categories as specified by the National 
Standards issued by the Internal Revenue Service.”). 
 65. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (“The debtor’s monthly expenses shall be the debtor’s applicable 
monthly expense amounts specified under the National Standards.”). 
 66. Id. (“The debtor’s monthly expenses shall be . . . the debtor’s actual monthly expenses for the 
categories specified as Other Necessary Expenses issued by the Internal Revenue Service for the area in 
which the debtor resides.”). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id.; Census Bureau, IRS Data, and Administrative Expenses Multipliers, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, 
https://www.justice.gov/ust/means-testing/20181101 (last visited Mar. 19, 2019). 
 69. Means Testing, supra note 52. These allowed expenses do not include any payments by the debtor 
on account of a secured debt; these payments are covered elsewhere in the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 
U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii). This distinction is important because, while these Local Standards payments 
are capped at the amounts determined by the Service, payments on account of secured debts are capped 
at the debtor’s actual payment amounts, meaning a debtor who makes mortgage payments secured by a 
house in excess of the Service’s Local Standards is able to deduct from income the full payment amount, 
while a debtor who makes rental payments in excess of the Service’s Local Standards is limited to the 
Service’s number. 
 70. Means Testing, supra note 52. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
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split over whether a debtor is entitled to the full expense amounts determined by the 
Service for each local standard category if the debtor’s actual monthly expenses are 
lower.73 In 2011, however, the Supreme Court decided Ransom v. FIA Card Ser-
vices, holding that if a debtor’s actual expense in the vehicle ownership cost cate-
gory was zero, the debtor was not entitled to any deduction for that category.74 
The third set of expenses that a debtor includes in his or her total allowed 
monthly expenses are four items that the court may include at its discretion.75 First, 
the court may include the debtor’s actual monthly expenses for the care and support 
of certain household and family members if the amounts are reasonable and neces-
sary, the beneficiary of the expenses is unable to pay for those expenses, and the 
expenses are for a continuation of care already being provided prior to the filing of 
the debtor’s bankruptcy petition.76 Providing care for an aging parent is one exam-
ple of this expense.77 Second, if the debtor would otherwise be eligible under Chap-
ter 13, the court may include the actual administrative expenses that the debtor 
would incur under a hypothetical Chapter 13 plan, including up to 10% of the 
debtor’s projected Chapter 13 plan payments.78 Third, the court may include, at its 
discretion, the debtor’s actual monthly expenses for elementary or secondary school 
tuition costs for the debtor’s dependent children under the age of 18, up to $2,050 
per child,79 if the debtor documents the expenses, explains why they are reasonable 
and necessary, and shows that they are not already covered by the Service’s Na-
tional Standards, Local Standards, or Other Necessary Expenses.80 Finally, the court 
may include an additional allowance for housing and utilities above the amount set 
forth in the Service’s Local Standards, up to the debtor’s actual expenses, if the 
debtor documents those expenses and shows that they are reasonable and neces-
sary.81 
The fourth set of relevant expenditures relates to the debtor’s secured debts. 
The court calculates the total amount of all payments contractually owed to the 
                                                          
 73. See, e.g., In re Canales, 377 B.R. 658, 662 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2007) (citing 18 cases holding that 
debtors do not get the expense amount if they have no expense whatsoever in the category, and seventeen 
cases reaching the opposite result). 
 74. Ransom v. FIA Card Services, N.A., 562 U.S. 61, 80 (2011) (“[W]e hold that the Local Standard 
expense amount for transportation ‘Ownership Costs’ is not ‘applicable’ to a debtor who will not incur 
any such costs during his bankruptcy plan.”). 
 75. 11 U.S.C. §§ 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(II)–(V) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-8) (all noting “the 
debtor’s monthly expenses may include” these amounts) (emphasis added). 
 76. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(II) (“[T]he debtor’s monthly expenses may include, if applicable, the 
continuation of actual expenses paid by the debtor that are reasonable and necessary for care and support 
of an elderly, chronically ill, or disabled household member or member of the debtor’s immediate family 
(including parents, grandparents, siblings, children, and grandchildren of the debtor, the dependents of 
the debtor, and the spouse of the debtor in a joint case who is not a dependent) and who is unable to pay 
for such reasonable and necessary expenses.”). 
 77. Id. 
 78. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(III). Presumably, this provision exists because if a debtor is eligible 
for Chapter 13 and is kicked out of Chapter 7 due to a presumption of abuse under the means test, the 
debtor would incur these administrative expenses under the subsequent Chapter 13 repayment plan, ul-
timately reducing the amount the debtor would be able to pay to his or her creditors. Because the point 
of these calculations is to determine how much the debtor can repay his or her creditors, it therefore 
makes sense to include these expenses in the calculation of the debtor’s total allowed expenses. 
 79. This amount is indexed for inflation. See 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (2012). 
 80. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV). 
 81. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(V). 
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debtor’s secured creditors over the next 60 months.82 Next, the court adds to that 
amount any additional payments that the debtor would have to pay to his or her 
secured creditors under a Chapter 13 plan in order to retain possession of his or her 
primary residence, motor vehicle, or other property needed to support the debtor 
and his or her dependents, but only if those items also serve as collateral for the 
related secured debt.83 The court then divides the total amount by 60 for the amount 
added to the debtor’s total allowed monthly expenses for secured debt.84 
The final set of allowed expenses concerns any priority unsecured claims that 
the debtor must pay.85 Bankruptcy Code § 507 governs priority unsecured claims, 
which include domestic support obligations,86 certain taxes,87 and claims against the 
debtor for death or personal injury resulting from drunk driving or boating.88 The 
court divides the total of priority claims by 60 to determine the amount to add to the 
debtor’s total allowed monthly expenses for this final category.89 
iii. Comparing the Repayment Amount with the Threshold 
Amount 
After calculating the debtor’s total allowed monthly expenses, the court sub-
tracts those expenses from the debtor’s current monthly income and multiplies the 
resulting number by 60, giving the amount of money the debtor is deemed able to 
repay to his or her general unsecured creditors (the “repayment amount”) over a 
typical five-year Chapter 13 plan.90 Then, the court compares the repayment amount 
to a statutorily-prescribed threshold amount in deciding whether the debtor’s bank-
ruptcy petition constitutes substantial abuse.91 
To determine the threshold amount, the court adds all of the debtor’s non-pri-
ority unsecured claims and divides that amount by four (the “unsecured remain-
der”).92 If the unsecured remainder is less than or equal to $8,175, the debtor’s 
threshold amount is $8,175. If the unsecured remainder is greater than $8,175 and 
                                                          
 82. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I). Note that this is not duplicative of the mortgage amounts allowed 
under the IRS’s Local Standards earlier in the Bankruptcy Code; instead, if the mortgage is secured by 
the home, the expense is allowed here rather than under the National Standards language. See Means 
Testing, supra note 52. 
 83. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(II). 
 84. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii). The amount is divided by 60 because most payment plans in a 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy span 60 months, and the court is attempting to establish how much the debtor 
could pay to creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i). 
 85. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iv). Because priority unsecured claims are first in line for repayment 
from the debtor after secured creditors are repaid, it is appropriate to include these payments in the 
debtor’s total allowed monthly expenses to determine how much the debtor will be able to pay his re-
maining, non-priority, unsecured creditors under § 707(b)(2)(A). See 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(1) (2012). Com-
mon priority claims are administrative expenses, unsecured claims tax obligations, and domestic support 
obligations. WARREN ET AL., supra note 17, at 230–33. 
 86. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-8). 
 87. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8). 
 88. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(10). For a more in-depth discussion of priority claims, see WARREN ET AL., 
supra note 17, at 230–33. 
 89. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iv). 
 90. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i) (The repayment amount equals “the debtor’s current monthly income 
reduced by the amounts determined under clauses (ii), (iii), and (iv), and multiplied by 60.”). 
 91. Id. 
 92. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) (The unsecured remainder equals “25 percent of the debtor’s 
nonpriority unsecured claims in the case.”). 
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less than or equal to $13,650, the debtor’s threshold amount equals the unsecured 
remainder. If the unsecured remainder is greater than $13,650, the debtor’s thresh-
old amount is $13,650.93 The threshold amount establishes the minimum amount 
the Bankruptcy Code would require a debtor to repay his or her general unsecured 
creditors in a theoretical Chapter 13 case.94 Finally, the court compares the debtor’s 
repayment amount to the threshold amount.95 If the repayment amount is less than 
the threshold amount, the means test does not create an automatic presumption of 
abuse.96 If, however, the debtor’s repayment amount is equal to or greater than the 
threshold amount, the means test raises the presumption of abuse.97 
C. Voluntary Conversion by a Debtor 
In contrast to the complexity of the means test, the statutory provisions govern-
ing a debtor’s voluntary conversion from one bankruptcy chapter to another are 
relatively straightforward.98 Except for Chapter 9, which applies only to municipal-
ities and other governmental debtors,99 every chapter of the Bankruptcy Code under 
which debtors can seek relief contains a mechanism for at least some debtors to 
convert their cases to another chapter.100 
i. Statutory Requirements for Conversion 
For purposes of this article, the relevant provision is § 1307(a), which provides 
that a “debtor may convert a case under this chapter to a case under [C]hapter 7 of 
this title at any time.”101 A Chapter 13 debtor cannot convert to Chapter 7, however, 
unless he or she is eligible to be a debtor under Chapter 7.102 To be an eligible 
Chapter 7 debtor, the debtor must either reside in the United States or have a                                                           
 93. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i) (The threshold amount equals “the lesser of (I) [the unsecured remain-
der] or $8,175, whichever is greater; or (II) $13,650.”) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-8). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. (“[T]he court shall presume abuse exists if the debtor’s [repayment amount] is not less than the 
lesser of” the debtor’s threshold amount.). 
 96. See id. Note that this does not mean the debtor cannot be kicked out of Chapter 7 for abuse; it 
means only that the means test does not give rise to an automatic presumption of abuse. See, e.g., 11 
U.S.C. § 707(b)(3) (providing other factors that a court may consider when determining whether the 
granting of relief under the bankruptcy code would be an abuse of the code when the means test either 
does not give rise to a presumption of abuse or is rebutted). 
 97. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i) (“[T]he court shall presume abuse exists . . .”) (emphasis added). The 
debtor may rebut the presumption by establishing special circumstances, including a medical illness or 
call to military active duty. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i). 
 98. See 2 NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC. 3d § 39:1 (stating “Voluntary conversion of bankruptcy cases 
among the operative chapters of the Code (Chapters 7, 11, 12, and 13) is generally simple.”). 
 99. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-8) (defining which entities may be a 
debtor under Chapter 9). 
 100. See 11 U.S.C. § 706(a) (2012) (providing conversion from Chapter 7 to Chapters 11, 12, or 13 
unless the debtor has already converted from one of those chapters to Chapter 7); 11 U.S.C. § 1112(a) 
(2012) (authorizing conversion from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7 unless either the debtor is not a debtor in 
possession, the debtor’s bankruptcy is involuntary, or the case was previously converted to Chapter 11 
and the debtor did not request that conversion); 11 U.S.C. § 1208(a) (2012) (allowing conversion from 
Chapter 12 to Chapter 7 at any time); 11 U.S.C. § 1307(a) (2012) (permitting conversion from Chapter 
13 to Chapter 7 at any time). 
 101. 11 U.S.C. § 1307(a). 
 102. 11 U.S.C. § 1307(g) (“[A] case may not be converted to a case under another chapter of this title 
unless the debtor may be a debtor under such chapter.”). 
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domicile, a place of business, or some property in the United States103 and must not 
be a disqualifying person.104 While an original Chapter 7 debtor can be a number of 
entities,105 because a Chapter 13 debtor must be an individual person rather than a 
corporation or other non-person entity,106 any debtor attempting to convert from 
Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 also will necessarily be an individual. 
The actual procedures that a debtor must follow to convert a case voluntarily 
are equally simple. To convert his or her case from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7, the 
debtor files a notice of conversion pursuant to § 1307(a).107 No court order is re-
quired to effectuate the conversion, and the court clerk must deliver notice of the 
conversion to the United States Trustee.108 
ii.   Interpreting Legislative Intent of Conversion Under §§ 
706 & 1307 
While the qualifications and procedure for conversion from Chapter 13 to 
Chapter 7 are straightforward, the consequences of conversion are far less clear. In 
unpacking the consequences of conversion, Congress’s intent in enacting § 1307(a) 
would be instructive. Unfortunately, Congress rarely discusses its policy justifica-
tions behind allowing a debtor to convert from one chapter to another. 
The House explained its intent for allowing debtors to convert from Chapter 7 
to Chapter 13 when it first considered adding § 706 to the Bankruptcy Code.109 
“Subsection (a) of [§ 706] gives the debtor one absolute right of conversion of a 
liquidation case to a reorganization or individual repayment plan case. . . . The pol-
icy of the provision is that the debtor should always be given the opportunity to 
repay his debts.”110 However, the House provided no explanations of its intent for 
allowing conversions unfettered from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 when discussing § 
1307.111 
Similarly, the 1978 Senate Report provided no express explanations regarding 
its intent in enacting § 1307; however, the report noted that the problems propelling 
a debtor into bankruptcy often do not go away after the debtor files under Chapter 
13, inevitably leading to the ultimate dismissal or conversion of some cases even 
after the debtor has made some payments under his or her bankruptcy plan.112 The 
1978 Senate Report suggests that Congress intended to allow voluntary conversions 
                                                          
 103. 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-8) (“[O]nly a person that resides or has a 
domicile, place of business, or property in the United States . . . may be a debtor under this title.”). 
 104. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(b) (listing railroads, foreign and domestic insurance companies, and banks 
among the types of persons that cannot be debtors under Chapter 7). 
 105. Id. (only denying Chapter 7 status to railroads, domestic insurance companies, domestic banks, 
savings and loan associations, building and loan associations, homestead associations, and various other 
financial institutions, and certain foreign insurance companies and financial institutions). See also 11 
U.S.C. § 109(a) (noting that municipalities may be debtors under Title 11). 
 106. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (“Only an individual . . . may be a debtor under Chapter 13 of this title.”). 
 107. FED. R. BANKR. P. 1017(f)(3) (“A chapter 12 or chapter 13 case shall be converted without court 
order when the debtor files a notice of conversion under §§ 1208(a) or 1307(a).”). 
 108. Id. 
 109. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 380 (1977). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 428. Subsequent revisions to the Bankruptcy Code have yielded no further discussion of the 
policy behind conversion. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 98-882 (1984) (Conf. Rep.); H.R. REP. NO. 109-31(I), 
at 297–98 (2005). 
 112. S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 12 (1978). 
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from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 because debtors will sometimes be unable to make all 
plan payments, especially if their financial situations either fail to improve or 
worsen after initially filing for bankruptcy.113 
While inferences may need to be made to ascertain Congress’s intent in enact-
ing § 1307(a), its legislative history strongly suggests that § 1307(a) affords the 
debtor “an absolute right of conversion to a [Chapter 7] liquidation case. . . .”114 
However, in 2007, the Supreme Court in Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachu-
setts threw this seemingly absolute right into question.115 
In Marrama, the Court held that a Chapter 7 debtor forfeited his ability to con-
vert to Chapter 13 because of his bad faith conduct when he made misleading and 
inaccurate statements on his schedules of assets.116 The Court agreed that § 706 
authorizes a debtor’s conversion from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13 and also noted the 
1978 Senate Report described the right as being absolute.117 However, the Court 
held that considering the right to convert as absolute is an overstatement because a 
debtor’s ability to convert is contingent on his or her qualification as a debtor under 
the destination chapter.118 Further, the Court reasoned that the right to convert is not 
absolute because a bankruptcy court’s statutory ability to dismiss or convert a Chap-
ter 13 proceeding for cause under § 1307(c) “is tantamount to a ruling that the indi-
vidual does not qualify as a debtor under Chapter 13.”119 The Court acknowledged 
that a bankruptcy court has broad authority “to take any action that is necessary or 
appropriate ‘to prevent an abuse of process’ as described in § 105(a) of the [Bank-
ruptcy] Code” and also has “inherent power of every federal court to sanction ‘abu-
sive litigation practices.’”120 
While Marrama dealt with conversion from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13, similari-
ties between both types of conversion suggest that applying the Court’s logic in 
Marrama would apply equally to conversions from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 for 
three reasons. First, §§ 706(a) and 1307(a) both state that a debtor “may convert” 
the case.121 Second, both § 706(d) and § 1307(g) prohibit a case from being con-
verted unless the debtor may be a debtor under the destination chapter.122 Finally, 
§§ 1307(c) and 707(b)(1) authorize a court to dismiss or forcibly convert a case 
                                                          
 113. Indeed, the rate of debtors successfully completing a Chapter 13 plan suggest most debtors’ finan-
cial situations fail to improve or worsen after filing. Scott F. Norberg, Consumer Bankruptcy’s New 
Clothes: An Empirical Study of Discharge and Debt Collection in Chapter 13, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. 
REV. 415, 439–40 (1999) (noting approximately one-third completion rate in empirical study); William 
C. Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized Justice: Consumer Bankruptcy as Consumer Protection, and 
Consumer Protection in Consumer Bankruptcy, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 397, 411 (1994) (referring to 31% 
completion of Chapter 13 plans). 
 114. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 428; S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 141 (section 1307’s legislative history 
strongly “confirm[s], without qualification, the rights of a Chapter 13 debtor to convert the case to a 
liquidating bankruptcy case under Chapter 7 of Title 11, at any time”); see also In re DeFrantz, 454 B.R. 
108, 113 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011); but see discussion of Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365 
(2007), infra notes 115–127 and accompanying text (discussing Marrama). 
 115. Marrama, 549 U.S. 365. 
 116. Id. at 371. 
 117. Id. at 372 (citing S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 94). 
 118. Id. at 372–74. 
 119. Id. at 373–74. 
 120. Id. at 375–76. 
 121. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 706(a) (2012), with 11 U.S.C. § 1307(a) (2012). In fact, the Court pointed 
out that the appellate court below focused on the statute’s use of “may” instead of “shall” in its ruling. 
Marrama, 549 U.S. at 370–71. 
 122. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 706(d), with 11 U.S.C. § 1307(g). 
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under certain circumstances.123 Given the similarities between §§ 706 and 1307, 
Marrama’s holding that a bankruptcy court cannot convert a Chapter 7 case dis-
missed due to bad faith to a Chapter 13 case should equally apply in cases converted 
from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7. Thus, legislative history suggests that Congress in-
tended for Chapter 13 debtors to convert to Chapter 7 if they are unable to complete 
their bankruptcy plans, and the right to convert from Chapter 13 to 7 may be con-
ditioned upon eligibility under the destination chapter and their lack of bad faith 
behavior. 
One overarching issue that often arises with conversion is whether the provi-
sions of the chapter under which the debtor originally filed or those of the destina-
tion chapter control the case. The Bankruptcy Code itself answers many of these 
questions, dictating, for example, that a conversion does not change the date of the 
filing of the debtor’s petition or the commencement of the case.124 Not all issues are 
resolved in the Bankruptcy Code, however, and courts occasionally have differed 
on how to resolve these unanswered questions.125 One issue that has proven to di-
vide the courts since BAPCPA’s enactment is whether the means test applies to 
debtors that voluntarily convert their bankruptcy cases from Chapter 13 to Chapter 
7. 
III. THE DIVIDED COURTS 
Since BAPCPA’s enactment in 2005, at least 23 courts have addressed whether 
the means test applies to bankruptcy cases voluntarily converted from Chapter 13 
to Chapter 7. These courts are divided, with a majority holding, for a variety of 
reasons that the means test applies to a converted case.126 A robust minority of 
courts have held, however, that the means test does not apply.127 The discussion 
below summarizes the most important cases addressing the question and outlines 
the main rationales that courts employ in adopting each view. 
A.  Courts Holding That the Means Test Applies to Con-
verted Cases 
This subsection summarizes four key opinions holding that the means test ap-
plies in converted cases: In re Perfetto,128 In re Kerr,129 In re Willis,130 and Pollitzer 
v. Gebhardt.131 In re Perfetto is the first published opinion on the issue of whether 
the means test applies in converted cases, and Pollitzer is the first court of appeals 
opinion to address the issue. 
                                                          
 123. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c), with 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1). 
 124. 11 U.S.C. § 348(a) (2012). 
 125. See, e.g., In re Lindberg, 735 F.2d 1087 (8th Cir. 1984) (ruling exemptions are determined as of 
the date of conversion), superseded by statute as stated in In re Alexander, 236 F.3d 431, 432 (8th Cir. 
2001); In re Ferretti, 230 B.R. 883, 884 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999), aff’d, 268 F.3d 1065 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(exemptions are determined as of the date of filing). 
 126. See cases cited supra notes 23–24. 
 127. See cases cited supra note 24. 
 128. 361 B.R. 27 (Bankr. D.R.I. 2007). 
 129. 2007 Bankr. WL 2119291 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. July 18, 2007). 
 130. 408 B.R. 803 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2009). 
 131. 860 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2017). 
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i. In re Perfetto 
In re Perfetto is the first published opinion on whether the means test applies 
in converted cases. On May 30, 2006, Christine Perfetto filed a voluntary Chapter 
13 bankruptcy petition.132 Two weeks later, she filed Form B22C,133 a statement of 
current monthly income and a calculation of disposable income, as well as other 
required schedules, revealing a monthly net cash flow loss coupled with $13,855 in 
unsecured, non-priority consumer debt.134 On the same day, Perfetto converted her 
case from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7, although nothing indicated any change in her 
circumstances.135 
Following her conversion, Perfetto failed to file Form B22A,136 the means test 
form then applicable in Chapter 7 cases.137 Consequently, the court issued a Notice 
of Missing Documents and ordered her to file Form B22A within 15 days.138 Per-
fetto objected to the court’s order, arguing that she was not required to file Form 
B22A because § 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code does not apply to cases converted 
from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7.139 Perfetto based this argument on a plain reading of 
§ 707(b),140 asserting that the statute’s use of the word “filed” limited the court’s 
authority to dismiss cases based on the means test only to cases originally filed 
under Chapter 7, not to cases filed under another chapter and then converted to 
Chapter 7.141 Perfetto argued that because she originally filed her petition under 
Chapter 13, not Chapter 7, the plain meaning of § 707(b) prohibited the court from 
dismissing her case based on the means test.142 
The United States Trustee argued, in response, that § 707(b), along with the 
then-interim Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1007(b)(4),143 required a debtor 
in a Chapter 7 case to file Form B22A regardless of how the debtor entered Chapter 
7.144 The United States Trustee argued that Perfetto’s interpretation of § 707(b) con-
flicted with Congress’s goal in enacting BAPCPA of determining whether a debtor 
was abusing the bankruptcy system.145 Additionally, the United States Trustee ar-
gued that Perfetto’s interpretation would create a loophole avoiding the scrutiny of 
                                                          
 132. In re Perfetto, 361 B.R. at 28. 
 133. The contemporary equivalent of this form is Form 122C-1. See Means Testing, supra note 52. 
 134. In re Perfetto, 361 B.R. at 28. 
 135. Id. at 29. 
 136. The contemporary equivalent of this Form is Form 122A-1. See Means Testing, supra note 52. 
 137. In re Perfetto, 361 B.R. at 29. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. Perfetto alternatively argued that even if she was required to file Form B22A, her filing of 
Form B22C already established that her income was below the state’s median, so filing Form B22A 
would serve no purpose and she should be excused from the requirement. Id. 
 140. “After notice and a hearing, the court . . . may dismiss a case filed by an individual debtor under 
this chapter whose debts are primarily consumer debts . . . if it finds that the granting of relief would be 
an abuse of the provisions of this chapter.” 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1) (2012) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 
116-8) (emphasis added). 
 141. In re Perfetto, 361 B.R. at 30. 
 142. Id. 
 143. The current text of the rule reads, “Unless §707(b)(2)(D) applies, an individual debtor in a chapter 
7 case shall file a statement of current monthly income prepared as prescribed by the appropriate Official 
Form, and, if the current monthly income exceeds the median family income for the applicable state and 
household size, the information, including calculations, required by §707(b), prepared as prescribed by 
the appropriate Official Form.” FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(b)(4). 
 144. In re Perfetto, 361 B.R. at 30. 
 145. Id. 
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the means test by allowing debtors to file under Chapter 13 and then immediately 
convert to Chapter 7.146 
In holding that the means test applies to converted cases, the court rejected 
Perfetto’s simplistic interpretation in favor of a common sense approach, noting that 
the Bankruptcy Code must be read as a whole.147 Specifically, the court noted that 
while § 707(b) on its face applies only to cases filed under Chapter 7, § 348(a) 
provides that conversion of a case from one chapter to another “constitutes an order 
for relief under the chapter to which the case is converted, but . . . does not effect a 
change in the date of the filing of the petition, the commencement of the case, or 
the order for relief.”148 The court cited a number of cases explaining that the usual 
interpretation of § 348(a) is that a case converted from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 is 
deemed to be filed under Chapter 7 on the date on which the original Chapter 13 
petition was filed.149 Finally, the court agreed with the United States Trustee that 
then-interim Rule 1019(2) provided a new time period for filing substantial abuse 
motions under § 707(b) triggered by the conversion of a case from Chapter 13 to 
Chapter 7, and that this new time period for converted cases would be meaningless 
and lead to an absurd result if debtors in cases converted from Chapter 13 to Chapter 
7 did not have to comply with the means test.150 
Finally, the court expressed some sympathy for Perfetto’s point that applying 
the means test to cases converted from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 might occasionally 
lead to strange results, particularly if the conversion occurs months or years after 
the initial Chapter 13 filing.151 Because the means test in such a case would look to 
the debtor’s income for the six months prior to the initial Chapter 13 filing, the 
analysis might not reflect the debtor’s then-current financial situation at the time of 
conversion.152 However, this hypothetical situation was not applicable in Perfetto’s 
situation because she converted nearly immediately after filing her initial petition; 
thus, the possibility of incongruous results did not exist.153 Ultimately, the court left 
open the possibility of contrary holdings in the future, explaining that it would con-
sider similar cases in the future on an individual basis.154 
ii. In re Kerr 
In re Kerr was a consolidated opinion addressing whether the means test ap-
plied in two converted cases. The first debtor in this case, Stephanie Kallberg, filed 
a Chapter 13 petition on August 25, 2006, together with the required Form B22C.155                                                           
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 29–30. 
 148. Id. at 30; 11 U.S.C. § 348(a) (2012). 
 149. In re Perfetto, 361 B.R. at 30–31 (citing Resendez v. Lindquist, 691 F.2d 397, 399 (8th Cir. 1982)); 
In re Grydzuk, 353 B.R. 564, 568 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2006); In re Sours, 350 B.R. 261, 268 (Bankr. E.D. 
Va. 2006) (section 348(a) “mandates that a case which has been converted to Chapter 7 from Chapter 13 
. . . is deemed to be ‘filed under’ Chapter 7 on the date on which the Chapter 13 was filed”) (internal 
citations omitted); In re Capers, 347 B.R. 169, 171–72 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2006). See also In re Lyons, 162 
B.R. 242, 244 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1993). 
 150. In re Perfetto, 361 B.R. at 31. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. In re Kerr, 2007 WL 2119291, at *1 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. July 18, 2007). Form B22C’s contem-
porary equivalent is Form 122C-1. See Means Testing, supra note 52. 
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Her Chapter 13 plan proposed $670 monthly payments over a 60-month period, but 
she was unable to confirm a plan or make the required monthly plan payments.156 
As a result, approximately six months later, she converted her case to Chapter 7.157 
The second set of debtors, Michael and Dawna Kerr, filed their Chapter 13 
petition on July 17, 2006.158 Their Form B22C showed a monthly disposable income 
of $5,977.06, and their confirmed Chapter 13 plan required $5,500 in monthly pay-
ments.159 For reasons described by the court simply as economic problems, the 
Kerrs were unable to make these payments for very long, and they converted their 
case to Chapter 7 approximately eight months after filing.160 
The court noted that each case presented three issues: (1) whether the means 
test applies to cases converted from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7; (2) if so, whether the 
Bankruptcy Code and Rules required such debtors to file Form B22A161; and (3), if 
so, whether Form B22A should reference income and expenses as they existed on 
the original petition date or on the conversion date.162 
As in Perfetto, the debtors in Kerr argued that the plain language of § 707(b), 
allowing the court to dismiss for abuse “a case filed by an individual debtor under 
this chapter,”163 indicated that the means test applied only to cases initially filed 
under Chapter 7.164 The United States Trustee, meanwhile, argued that “under this 
chapter” only modified “case,” not “filed,” so the means test applied to any case 
under Chapter 7.165 
In agreeing with the United States Trustee, the court noted that, prior to 
BAPCPA, courts universally applied § 707(b) to cases converted from Chapter 13 
to Chapter 7, and BAPCPA did not change the interpretation of the phrase “filed by 
an individual debtor under this chapter.”166 The court also stated that the word 
“filed” was not limited to the initial filing of a case, but included other actions to 
enter a legal document on an official public record, such as a docket.167 Under this 
meaning of “filed,” the court explained that a case converted from Chapter 13 to 
Chapter 7 is filed in the sense it is entered on the court’s docket under Chapter 7 
when the debtor filed a motion to convert.168 
The court’s analysis also noted that, as the court did in Perfetto, § 348(a) re-
tained the original filing date for converted cases but otherwise treated converted 
cases as if a debtor had originally filed his or her case under the new chapter.169 The 
                                                          
 156. In re Kerr, 2007 WL 2119291, at *1. Kerr could not get a plan confirmed because, as a real estate 
agent earning her income primarily based on commissions, she could not make regular plan payments 
or confirm a plan. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Form B22A’s contemporary equivalent is Form 122A-1. See Means Testing, supra note 52. 
 162. Id. 
 163. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-8). 
 164. In re Kerr, 2007 WL 2119291, at *2. 
 165. Id. at *2. 
 166. Id. at *3; 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2). See, e.g., In re Morris, 153 B.R. 559, 563–65 (Bankr. D. Or. 
1993) (case converted from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 dismissed under Section 707(b)); In re Traub, 140 
B.R. 286, 291 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1992) (dismissal under § 707(b) of a case converted from Chapter 11 to 
Chapter 7). 
 167. In re Kerr, 2007 WL 2119291, at *3. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
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court also pointed out that § 521(a)(1)(B)(ii) and Rule 1007(b) require a debtor to 
file a schedule of current income and expenditures as of the time of conversion.170 
Finally, the Kerr court addressed one inconsistency that caused a court in an-
other case to hold that the means test did not apply to converted cases.171 The Kerr 
court observed that § 342(d) required the clerk to give notice to creditors within ten 
days after the filing of the petition if a presumption of abuse has arisen, but § 348(c) 
says that § 342 applies to a converted case as if the conversion order is the order for 
relief, not the date of the filing of the petition.172 The court noted the absence of 
guidance detailing how the clerk should comply with his or her duty in a converted 
case to give notice that the presumption of abuse has arisen because the petition 
date might be far more than ten days separated from the date of the conversion 
order.173 While acknowledging that the other court regarded this as proof that the 
means test was not applicable to converted cases, the Kerr court decided that this 
was merely sloppy drafting.174 
After holding the means test applied to converted cases, the court also held that 
debtors in such cases are required to file Form B22A.175 In addressing the issue of 
whether such debtors should include in Form B22A their income and expenses as 
of the initial date of filing or the later date of conversion, the court noted that both 
§§ 707(b)(2)(C) and 521 require debtors to disclose their “current monthly income,” 
which § 101(10A) defines as a debtor’s average monthly income for the six-month 
period preceding “the date of the commencement of the case.”176 Because § 348(a) 
does not change the date of the commencement of the case when a case is converted, 
the court determined that a debtor’s current monthly income is based on the date 
that the initial petition is filed.177 
Regarding expenses, the court acknowledged that while neither “monthly ex-
penses” nor “current expenditures” is defined in the Bankruptcy Code or Rules, § 
707(b) refers to “Other Necessary Expenses . . . as in effect on the date of the order 
for relief.”178 Again noting that § 348(a) preserves the original date of the order for 
relief, the court ruled that the debtors’ expenses were based on the date of filing of 
the petition, especially because reviewing the debtors’ income and expenses from 
different time periods would be illogical.179 The court noted that this framework 
might not accurately reveal the debtor’s financial situation as of the date of conver-
sion if conversion happened long after the initial petition filing date, but noted that 
this risk would depend on when conversion occurred in a given case.180 The court 
seemed to leave open the possibility that it might rule otherwise under different 
factual circumstances.181 
                                                          
 170. Id. at *4. 
 171. Id.; In re Fox, 370 B.R. 639, 645 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007); see also infra notes 241–265 and accom-
panying text. 
 172. In re Kerr, 2007 WL 2119291, at *4. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id.; In re Fox, 370 B.R. at 645. 
 175. In re Kerr, 2007 WL 2119291, at *4. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at *5; 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-8). 
 179. In re Kerr, 2007 WL 2119291, at *5. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
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Finally, the court addressed the debtor’s contention that if the means test ap-
plies to converted cases, filing Form B22A is unnecessary because it would merely 
repeat the information contained in the already-filed Form B22C.182 The court re-
jected this argument, noting the differences between the two forms, such as the 
treatment of spousal income, the availability of certain disabled veteran exclusions, 
and the deduction of certain administrative costs.183 Thus, the court required the 
debtors to file Form B22A upon conversion.184 Similarly, the court dismissed the 
debtors’ argument that applying the means test to converted cases would lead to 
debtors being harassed by creditors moving for dismissal under the abuse provisions 
of § 707(b).185 The court pointed out that § 707(b) gives rise only to a presumption 
of abuse, which can be rebutted by a debtor’s showing of changed financial circum-
stances between the petition filing date and the conversion date.186 
iii. In re Willis 
The first Missouri court to face the issue of whether the means test applies in a 
case converted from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 is In re Willis. In Willis, the debtor, 
Jason Willis, filed a voluntary Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on May 9, 2008.187 
Willis then moved to convert the case to Chapter 7 on September 5, 2008 and con-
currently filed Form B22A, although he argued that filing it was unnecessary.188 
The United States Trustee moved to dismiss the case for abuse under the means test, 
noting that the presumption of abuse in this particular case would arise if the debtor 
had more than $182.50 in monthly disposable income and if, at the time he filed, 
Willis had $2,627.86 in monthly disposable income.189 
At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the United States Trustee conceded 
that Willis’s circumstances had changed, and that he only had $474.55 of monthly 
disposable income by the time he converted his case.190 Willis argued that his in-
come and that of his non-filing spouse had severely declined and would continue to 
drop in upcoming months, and that he had $250 of monthly child care expenses that 
the United States Trustee would not consider in the means test calculation because 
he could not provide sufficient documentation.191 
Similar to the above cases, Willis argued that the plain language of § 707(b) 
precluded application of the means test to converted cases.192 The United States 
Trustee argued that other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code make it clear that con-
verted cases are deemed to have been filed under Chapter 7.193 
                                                          
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at *6. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. 408 B.R. 803, 805 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2009). 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 806. 
 193. Id. The court makes no mention of which other provisions the United States Trustee referenced. 
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The court noted that a fairly-even split had developed on this issue among bank-
ruptcy courts, citing In re Ryder194 and In re Fox,195 holding that the means test does 
not apply to converted cases, and Kellett,196 Kerr, and Perfetto reaching the opposite 
conclusion.197 The court noted that all five courts based their rulings on the plain 
language of the statute and on advancing the policy goals of the Bankruptcy 
Code.198 
The court raised and dismissed the three principal reasons the Ryder and Fox 
courts relied on in determining that the means test did not apply in converted 
cases.199 First, the court rejected the rationale that because § 707(b) does not explic-
itly refer to converted cases, then the means test does not apply.200 The court re-
jected this rationale because a “broader, contextual interpretation” of the Bank-
ruptcy Code strongly suggests that § 707(b) applies in converted cases.201 The court 
also noted that § 1328(f)202 references cases “filed under Chapter 7” and has been 
interpreted nearly unanimously to apply to converted cases.203 The court found par-
ticularly persuasive the “apparently unanimous agreement among courts that, for 
purposes of [§] 1328(f), the phrase ‘filed under Chapter 7’ encompasses cases con-
verted under Chapter 13 to Chapter 7.”204 Given the substantial phraseology be-
tween §§ 707(b) and 1328(f), the court applied the statutory canon, “Identical words 
used in different parts of the same statute generally are presumed to have the same 
meaning.”205 The court then agreed with the Kerr court that “filed” means more 
than just filing the initial petition and also includes other actions that put a case on 
a court’s docket.206 
Second, the Willis court determined that when examined in conjunction with § 
348(a), § 348(b) does not limit when conversion is treated as the order for relief 
under the destination chapter, but rather only limits when conversion changes the 
date of the filing of the petition, the commencement of the case, or the order for 
relief.207 The court found further support for its argument in an Eighth Circuit case 
dealing with the timing for determining what property is included in the debtor’s 
estate. In that case, the Eighth Circuit held that under § 348(a), “when there is a 
                                                          
 194. In re Ryder, 2008 WL 3845246 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2008). 
 195. See infra notes 241–265 and accompanying text. 
 196. 379 B.R. 332 (Bankr. Or. 2007). 
 197. In re Willis, 408 B.R. at 806. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 806–07. 
 200. Id. at 809. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Section 1328(f) addresses the time limitations for when a discharge may be obtained under Chap-
ter 13, similar to § 707(b). 11 U.S.C. § 1328(f) (2012) (“Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b), the 
court shall not grant a discharge of all debts provided for in the plan or disallowed under section 502, if 
the debtor has received a discharge—(1) in a case filed under chapter 7, 11, or 12 of this title during the 
4-year period preceding the date of the order for relief under this chapter, or (2) in a case filed under 
chapter 13 of this title during the 2-year period preceding the date of such order.”). 
 203. In re Willis, 408 B.R. at 809–10. 
 204. Id. at 809 (citing In re Resendez, 691 F.2d 397, 399 (8th Cir. 1982)); see also In re Knighton, 355 
B.R. 922, 925–26 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2006); In re Grydzuk, 353 B.R. 564, 569 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2006); In 
re Sours, 350 B.R. 261, 267–68 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2006); In re Capers, 347 B.R. 169, 172–73 (Bankr. 
D.S.C. 2006). 
 205. In re Willis, 408 B.R. at 809. 
 206. Id. at 808–09. 
 207. Id. at 809. 
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conversion, the debtors are deemed to have filed a Chapter 7 case at the time the 
Chapter 13 case was filed.”208 
Finally, the court rejected the rationale that applying the means test to con-
verted cases may lead to absurd results because the calculation of the debtor’s cur-
rent monthly income is made as of the date of filing the petition; the argument goes 
that this could potentially lead to cases in which this calculation is no longer repre-
sentative of the debtor’s then-current income and would ultimately force a debtor 
back into Chapter 13 or force the dismissal of his or her case.209 The court, in re-
jecting the absurd results argument, explained that a debtor can circumvent the 
problem by following the steps in § 707(b)(2)(B)210 to establish special circum-
stances justifying an adjustment to the calculation of his or her income and ex-
penses.211 The court also noted that the United States Trustee can exercise discretion 
under § 704(b)(2)212 and elect not to pursue dismissal in light of a debtor’s changed 
circumstances.213 
Ultimately, the court held that the means test applied to Willis’s case and the 
presumption of abuse applied.214 The court noted that Willis had at least $400 of 
disposable monthly income and failed to produce sufficient documentation to allow 
Willis’s claimed $250 monthly childcare expense, putting him over the abuse pre-
sumption threshold of $182.50.215 Because Willis failed to prove any special cir-
cumstances meriting rebuttal of the presumption of abuse, the court granted the 
United States Trustee’s motion to dismiss.216 
iv. Pollitzer v. Gebhardt 
Debtor Stratton Pollitzer filed a voluntary Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition in 
March 2011.217 Two years later, Pollitzer converted his case to Chapter 7.218 The 
United States Trustee argued that the debtor had substantial disposable income and 
could pay a significant amount to his unsecured creditors.219 Pollitzer responded 
that the means test does not apply in converted cases.220 
Pollitzer based his argument on the plain language of § 707(b). Namely, he 
argued that § 707(b) applies only to cases originally filed “under this chapter”—
                                                          
 208. Id. at 809–10 (quoting Resendez v. Lindquist, 691 F.2d 397, 399 (8th Cir. 1982)) (emphasis in 
original). 
 209. Id. at 810. 
 210. “In any proceeding brought under [§ 707(b)], the presumption of abuse may only be rebutted by 
demonstrating special circumstances, such as a serious medical condition or a call or order to active duty 
in the Armed Forces, to the extent such special circumstances that justify additional expenses or adjust-
ments of current monthly income for which there is no reasonable alternative.” 11 U.S.C. § 
707(b)(2)(B)(i) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-8). 
 211. In re Willis, 408 B.R. at 810. 
 212. “The United States trustee . . . shall . . . either file a motion to dismiss or convert under section 
707(b) or file a statement setting forth the reasons the United States trustee (or the bankruptcy adminis-
trator, if any) does not consider such a motion to be appropriate.” 11 U.S.C. § 704(b)(2) (2012). 
 213. In re Willis, 408 B.R. at 810. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. at 811. 
 217. Gebhardt v. Pollitzer, 860 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
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meaning cases only originally filed as Chapter 7 petitions.221 Conversely, the United 
States Trustee argued that “under this chapter” modifies the immediately adjacent 
phrase—”an individual debtor”—and because Pollitzer was a Chapter 7 individual 
debtor, § 707(b) applies.222 
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed a bankruptcy court’s decision to grant the United 
States Trustee’s motion to dismiss a converted debtor’s bankruptcy case for abuse 
because the debtor failed the means test.223 “Because there are unmistakable indi-
cations in the [Bankruptcy] Code that Congress intended § 707(b) to apply to con-
verted cases,” the Eleventh Circuit rejected Pollitzer’s textual argument.224 The 
court first reasoned that the textual evolution of § 707 strongly suggested that the 
means test applied in a converted case.225 While bankruptcy courts always had the 
option to dismiss petitions “for cause,” Congress added § 707(b) in 1984 to permit 
dismissal of a Chapter 7 case for petitions that courts found “substantially abusive” 
because most courts were unlikely to dismiss cases for cause where a Chapter 7 
debtor had substantial income to pay creditors.226 Twenty years later, Congress 
found debtors were still filing Chapter 7 cases when they ostensibly had disposable 
income available to pay creditors; as a result, in 2005 Congress lowered § 707(b)’s 
substantially abusive standard to merely abuse.227 According to the Eleventh Cir-
cuit, § 707(b)’s evolution strongly suggested that Congress “intended the current 
version of § 707(b) to be a potent tool for bankruptcy courts to expeditiously dismiss 
Chapter 7 petitions filed by debtors with income sufficient to pay their creditors.”228 
The court also determined that Pollitzer’s position would dilute § 707(b)’s po-
tency because it would allow a debtor to file under Chapter 13 and then immediately 
convert to Chapter 7 because of the debtor’s automatic right to convert a Chapter 
13 case, thereby sidestepping the means test.229 The court was similarly uncon-
vinced of Pollitzer’s argument that § 105(a) constituted a sufficient deterrent to pre-
vent abuse because a debtor could be found to have abused the bankruptcy system 
by converting the case immediately after filing.230 This argument was inconsistent 
with Congress’s initial adoption of § 707(b) because it became concerned that bank-
ruptcy courts were effectively abdicating their job of dismissing abusive Chapter 7 
bankruptcy petitions.231 
The court held that Congress excluded converted cases “from the reach of other 
sections of the Bankruptcy Code, but not from § 707(b).”232 According to the court, 
Congress’s exclusions are presumed to be intentional.233 Congress’s intent to in-
clude converted cases in § 707(b) is also reinforced by the fact that Congress 
                                                          
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. at 1338. 
 223. Id. at 1336–37. 
 224. Id. at 1338–39. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at 1338; Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 
Stat. 333, 335 (1984). 
 227. In re Gebhardt, 860 F.3d at 1338–39. 
 228. Id. at 1339. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. at 1338. 
 232. Id. at 1340 (citing as examples 11 U.S.C. §§ 1208(b), 1307(b)). 
 233. Id. 
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expressly exempted disabled veterans or those recently released from active duty 
from the means test.234 
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit considered it persuasive that Congress left Rule 
1019(2)(A) untouched when it passed BAPCPA.235 This rule sets a new time period 
for filing a § 707(b) motion to dismiss in a case converted from Chapter 13 to Chap-
ter 7.236 Because Rule 1019(2)(A) was unchanged by BAPCPA and there was no 
clear indication Congress intended to modify the application of this rule, the court 
held that converted cases were subject to the means test.237 
As the above summary of cases demonstrates, courts adopting the view that the 
means test applies in converted cases uniformly believed that, when a case is con-
verted to another chapter, it is deemed filed under the destination chapter. As a re-
sult, each court found that treating the case as filed under Chapter 7 required it to 
apply the means test to determine whether the filing constituted abuse of the bank-
ruptcy system. Additionally, these courts found it more important to prevent the 
potential abuse of the bankruptcy system by debtors filing under Chapter 13 and 
then immediately converting to Chapter 7 than to worry about how to calculate the 
debtor’s disposable income possibly years after their initial bankruptcy filing. By 
contrast, the cases summarized below find that the means test does not apply in 
converted cases, based largely on administrative concerns over the logistics of cal-
culating income and expenses under the means test. 
B.  Courts Holding That the Means Test Does Not Apply in 
Converted Cases 
This subsection summarizes the first published opinions to hold that the means 
test does not apply in converted cases: In re Fox.238 It then summarizes two key 
opinions adopting this view: In re Layton239 and In re Dudley.240 
i. In re Fox 
In Fox, the debtor, Sharon Fox, filed a Chapter 13 petition and quickly fell 
behind on her plan payments because she was laid off from her job.241 She then 
voluntarily converted her case to Chapter 7 approximately three months after filing 
for bankruptcy.242 The bankruptcy clerk’s office notified Fox that if she did not file 
Forms 122A and 122B243 the court would dismiss her case.244 Fox filed a motion 
for the court to determine that the means test did not apply in cases converted to 
Chapter 7, which the United States Trustee opposed.245                                                           
 234. Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(D) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-8). 
 235. In re Gebhardt, 860 F.3d at 1340; FED. R. BANKR. P. 1019(2)(A). 
 236. In re Gebhardt, 860 F.3d at 1340. 
 237. Id. 
 238. 370 B.R. 639 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007). 
 239. 480 B.R. 392 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012). 
 240. 405 B.R. 790 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2009). 
 241. In re Fox, 370 B.R. at 640–41. 
 242. Id. 
 243. The contemporary equivalents of these forms are Form 122A-1 and Form 122A-2. See Means 
Testing, supra note 52. 
 244. In re Fox, 370 B.R. at 640–41. 
 245. Id. at 641. 
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The court held that Congress plainly intended to limit the reach of the means 
test to case originally commenced under Chapter 7, therefore excluding converted 
cases.246 Thus, the means test did not apply.247 In its analysis, the court first deter-
mined that § 707(b)(1)’s language, authorizing a court to dismiss a case “filed by 
an individual debtor under this chapter” if the presumption of abuse arises, clearly 
and explicitly refers to cases filed under Chapter 7.248 Section 707, the court con-
cluded, “is plain in its mandate that a debtor ‘filing’ in [C]hapter 7 be subject to the 
means test computations.”249 The court rejected the United States Trustee’s asser-
tion that “filed,” as used in § 707(b)(1), should be read to include converted cases 
because §§ 707 and 342 repeatedly use the word “filed” and every other use of 
“filed” in those sections suggests application to converted cases.250 Section 707’s 
silence regarding converted cases implies § 707(b)(2) only requires debtors who 
originally filed a bankruptcy case under Chapter 7 to complete the means test.251 As 
further evidence of Congress’s intent to exclude converted cases from means test, 
the court noted that because § 707(b)(1) provides for dismissal or conversion to 
Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 if the court determines that the debtor was unable to rebut 
the presumption of abuse, “the drafters were contemplating the effect of conver-
sion” and, therefore, did not intend for the means test to apply to converted cases.252 
Additionally, the court reasoned that the lack of reference to § 707(b) in § 
348(b), defining the sections of the Bankruptcy Code where “order for relief” refers 
to the conversion of a case, suggested that Congress did not intend for the means 
test to apply in converted cases.253 The court also declined to find then-interim Rule 
1007(b)(4)’s “in a [C]hapter 7 case” language, requiring a debtor to file a statement 
of current monthly income and then complete the means test if her income is above 
the applicable median family income, relevant to Fox.254 Reasoning that rules can-
not “abridge, enlarge[,] or modify, any substantive right,” the court refused to “con-
tradict and supercede [sic] the unambiguous words of” § 707(b).255 Because the 
court found § 707(b)(1)’s language unambiguous, it declined to consider Congress’s 
intent in enacting BAPCPA.256 
The court rejected the United States Trustee’s reliance on the Perfetto257 deci-
sion on two grounds.258 First, it determined that the Perfetto court’s reliance on § 
348(a) language providing that conversion renders a case deemed filed under the 
destination chapter was irrelevant because conversion did not change the petition                                                           
 246. Id. at 643. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. at 645–46. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. at 643 (“The fact that the section provides for the dismissal or conversion to chapter 13 or 11 
where the court finds abuse is an indication that the drafters were contemplating the effect of conversion 
specifically in this subsection. If the drafters intended for cases converted to chapter 7 to be subject to 
this new requirement, they did not say so in the clear language of the section. Moreover, it would also 
seem counterintuitive to read the section to apply to those cases converted from chapter 13 where the 
section provides for conversion to chapter 13 as a possible consequence of a finding of ‘abuse.’”) (em-
phasis in original). 
 253. Id. at 643–44. 
 254. Id. at 644–45. 
 255. Id. at 645. 
 256. Id. at 646. 
 257. See supra notes 132–154 and accompany text. 
 258. In re Fox, 370 B.R. at 647. 
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date, the commencement of the case, or the order for relief.259 Second, the court 
rejected the Perfetto court’s conclusion that Congress intended that converted debt-
ors complete the means test “so that a review of the [d]ebtor’s financial condition 
could be conducted within the renewed filing period for motions under [§] 707(b)” 
as then-interim Rule 1019(2) required.260 The court refused to give this conclusion 
weight because it would give interpretive precedent to a rule contradicting § 
707(b)’s plain meaning.261 
Finally, the court rejected the United States Trustee’s argument that refusing to 
apply the means test in a converted case creates a loophole.262 The court cited other 
sections of the Bankruptcy Code, including §§ 1307(c) and 105(a), and the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Marrama v. Citizens Bank263 for the proposition that the court 
has ample authority to dismiss cases filed in bad faith.264 Ultimately, the court held 
that the means test did not apply.265 
ii. In re Layton 
In In re Layton, the debtor, Ronda Layton, initially filed a Chapter 13 petition 
but converted her case to Chapter 7 when she lost her job nearly two years after 
filing her case.266 Layton became re-employed after converting her case and began 
earning enough monthly disposable income to cause her to fail the means test.267 
The United States Trustee filed a motion to dismiss her case under § 707(b)(1).268 
The court made the initial determination that § 707(b)(1) was not plainly am-
biguous.269  Thus, it refused to look further into whether Congress’s intent in enact-
ing BAPCPA was to require an individual debtor to have filed a Chapter 7 petition 
for the means test to apply.270 The court then raised and dismissed the rationales of 
courts adopting the majority view.271 
First, the court rejected interpreting § 707(b)(1)’s “filed” as modifying 
“debtor,” because doing so would render superfluous the section’s use of the phrase 
“under this chapter.”272 Doing so, according to the court, would create “a strange 
irony . . . that . . . presupposes the drafters took great care and precision in drafting 
the language of § 707(b), but simultaneously ignores the bulk of the superfluous 
language left in the wrath.”273 
                                                          
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. at 648. 
 263. Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365 (2007); see also supra notes 115–20 and ac-
companying text (discussing Marrama). 
 264. In re Fox, 370 B.R. at 648. 
 265. Id. 
 266. 480 B.R. 392, 394 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012). 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. (“The section does not appear to be ambiguous on its face. A plain and rational interpretation 
suggests that an individual debtor must have voluntarily filed his or her original petition under chapter 7 
in order for § 707(b) to apply.”). 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. at 393–97. 
 272. Id. at 395 (citing Justice v. Advanced Control Solutions, Inc., 2008 WL 4368668 (W.D. Ark. Sep. 
22, 2008), aff’d, 639 F.3d 838 (8th Cir. 2011)). 
 273. Id. 
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Second, the court also rejected an expansive definition of “filed.”274 It noted 
that some courts holding that the means test applies in converted cases defined 
“filed” as meaning entering a legal document on an official public record.275 Thus, 
those courts posited that cases would be deemed filed under Chapter 7 when they 
are converted.276 However, the court rejected this reasoning and held that if it ex-
pansively defined “filed,” doing so would render § 707(b)’s language “under this 
chapter” superfluous.277 The court also reasoned that an expansive definition of 
“filed” ran contrary to its ordinary meaning and use in other Bankruptcy Code pro-
visions referring to the initial petition filing.278 
Third, in rejecting Perfetto’s determination that applying § 707(b)(1)’s plain 
meaning was contrary to legislative intent and could lead to absurd results,279 the 
court determined, without explanation, that adopting Perfetto’s common sense ap-
proach would “create an unreasonably unjust result for debtors.”280 Although it 
acknowledged the Perfetto court’s suggestion that § 707(b) would not be applied 
uniformly, the court did not provide an argument against the Perfetto court’s deter-
mination that excluding converted cases from the means test was contrary to legis-
lative intent or would lead to absurd results.281 
The court reasoned that any potential abuses of the means test in a converted 
case could be minimized by a dismissal for cause under § 707(a).282 Moreover, the 
court argued that its authority to dismiss a case for bad faith under § 105(a) and its 
“inherent power to sanction abusive litigation practices” would prevent debtors 
from abusing the bankruptcy process.283 The court held that using a debtor’s income 
history for the six-month period prior to filing was potentially detrimental to debt-
ors, and it posited that the risks inherent in that determination outweighed the pos-
sibility that debtors might use conversion to avoid application of the means test.284 
The court also acknowledged the common-sense approach holding that the 
means test applies in converted cases does not address the inherent conflict its in-
terpretation creates between §§ 707(b) and 342(d).285 While acknowledging that 
some courts have regarded this issue as “sloppy drafting,” the court determined that 
its plain language approach is preferable because it avoids the issue altogether.286 
Finally, the court recognized that its approach would render Rule 1019(2) su-
perfluous.287 However, the court reasoned that rendering a procedural rule mean-
ingless was better than rendering a statutory provision, such as § 342(d),                                                           
 274. Id. at 395–96. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. at 396 (explaining the interpretive consequence of the majority view’s expansive definition of 
“filed”). 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 342(d), 707(b)(3), 707(b)(4), 707(c)(2), and 707(c)(3) for their use of 
“filed” or “filing”). 
 279. Id. at 396–97; In re Perfetto, 361 B.R. 27, 29–30 (Bankr. D.R.I. 2007). 
 280. In re Layton, 480 B.R. at 397. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. at 398; 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012). 
 284. In re Layton, 480 B.R. at 398–99. 
 285. Id. at 398; 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-8); 11 U.S.C. § 342(d) (2012) 
(providing that the court “clerk shall give written notice to all creditors not later than 10 days after the 
date of the filing of the petition that the presumption of abuse has arisen” under § 707(b)). 
 286. In re Layton, 480 B.R. at 398; In re Kerr, 2007 WL 21192921, at *4 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. July 18, 
2007). 
 287. In re Layton, 480 B.R. at 399. 
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superfluous.288 The court noted that both views on the applicability of the means 
test in converted cases rely on contradictions and inconsistencies in construing pro-
visions of the Bankruptcy Code and its rules,289 but it ultimately held that Layton 
did not have to file Form B22A because the means test did not apply to her con-
verted case.290 
iii. In re Dudley 
Less than two months after filing, the Dudleys converted their case to Chapter 
7 in response to the Chapter 13 trustee’s motion to dismiss or convert their case for 
cause because they had scheduled unreasonable expenses.291 The United States 
Trustee also filed a motion to dismiss under § 707(b)(1), alleging that the presump-
tion of abuse arose under § 707(b)(2).292 The debtors argued, in response to the 
United States Trustee’s motion to dismiss, that § 707(b) did not apply to converted 
cases.293 
In its analysis, the court rejected an interpretation of § 707(b)(1) that construed 
“filed” as modifying “debtor” because applying it would render § 707(b)(1)’s 
phrase “under this chapter” superfluous.294 Therefore, citing Fourth Circuit prece-
dent holding that “filed under” as used in Bankruptcy Code § 1328(f)(2)295 means 
“initially filed,” the proper statutory interpretation was that “under this chapter” 
modifies “filed,” and “filed” does not modify “debtor.”296 
The court also reasoned that literal application of § 707(b)(1) did not produce 
an absurd result because it produced “fewer conflicts within the Bankruptcy Code 
as a whole” than the reasoning of opposing courts.297 Finally, the court reasoned 
that the plain language interpretation was not “demonstrably at odds” with congres-
sional intent in enacting § 707(a) because any abusive conversion could be dealt 
with by the United States Trustee filing a motion to dismiss for cause under § 
707(a).298 
                                                          
 288. Id. at 399–400. 
 289. Id. at 393. 
 290. Id. at 400. 
 291. In re Dudley, 405 B.R. 790, 792 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2009). 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. at 793–94. 
 295. 11 U.S.C. 1328(f)(2) (2012) (“Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b), the court shall not grant a 
discharge of all debts provided for in the plan or disallowed under section 502, if the debtor has received 
a discharge—(2) in a case filed under chapter 13 of this title during the 2-year period preceding the date 
of such order.”). 
 296. In re Dudley, 405 B.R. at 794–95 (citing Branigan v. Bateman (In re Bateman), 515 F.3d 272, 
277–78 (4th Cir. 2008)). Agreeing with other courts, including In re Fox, the court also reasoned that 
the plain meaning of § 707(b)(1) required avoiding an interpretation of § 348(a) that implies a converted 
case should be treated “as if” it had been filed under the destination chapter. Id. at 796–97; In re Fox, 
370 B.R. 639, 645–46 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007). 
 297. In re Dudley, 405 B.R. at 798. The court noted that courts holding that the means test applies in 
converted cases would create conflict with 11 U.S.C. § 342(d) (requiring the clerk of the court give 
notice to creditors within ten days after the filing of the petition if a presumption of abuse had arisen), 
and would require a presumption of abuse determination on an outdated Form B22A. Id. at 797–98. The 
court acknowledged, however, that its view conflicts with § 704(b)(1)(A), requiring the United States 
Trustee to make an abuse determination within ten days of the first meeting of creditors. Id. at 797; 11 
U.S.C. § 704(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
 298. In re Dudley, 405 B.R. at 798–800. 
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The preceding cases reveal that courts are not as concerned about debtor abuse 
of the bankruptcy system by filing for Chapter 13 and immediately converting to 
Chapter 7 as a way to circumvent the means test. Instead, these cases stress the 
inability of courts to apply the means test fairly when the debtor converts from 
Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 years after the initial bankruptcy filing. These cases point 
out that a calculation would require debtors to use outdated income figures in cal-
culating their current monthly income and it would make it impossible for court 
clerks to timely comply with their obligations under § 342(d). These cases, how-
ever, do not account for how their view makes it impossible for the United States 
Trustee to comply with its duties under § 704(b)(1)(A) or how its view renders Rule 
1019(2)’s new time period for filing § 707(b) motions in converted cases superflu-
ous. 
Overall, the above summaries of cases holding that the means test does or does 
not apply in converted cases reveals that both views create significant interpretive 
problems. The next section of this article outlines what courts and Congress should 
do to resolve this issue. 
IV. A MODEST PROPOSAL FOR HARMONIZING THE BANKRUPTCY 
CODE’S CONFLICTING STATUTORY LANGUAGE 
At least 23 courts have addressed the issue of whether the means test applies in 
cases converted from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7, and yet they remain hopelessly di-
vided. A majority of courts, including the Eleventh Circuit—the only court of ap-
peals to have considered the issue—hold that the means test applies in converted 
cases. In doing so, however, these courts have faced difficult interpretive problems. 
While a majority of the courts held that the means test must apply in converted cases 
to prevent debtors from abusing the bankruptcy process by filing under Chapter 13 
and immediately converting to Chapter 7, they have been forced to ignore or disre-
gard contrary statutory language. For example, § 342(d) provides that the clerk of 
the court must give notice to creditors within ten days after the filing of the petition 
if a presumption of abuse had arisen.299 Because conversion might occur months or 
years after the original filing of the petition, the clerk would not be able to discharge 
his or her duty properly in such cases. Some courts have simply ignored this difficult 
issue of statutory interpretation; others have grappled with it and ultimately dis-
missed the issue as a case of sloppy drafting.300 
Conversely, courts that have held that the means test does not apply in con-
verted cases have also faced difficulty interpretive issues. They have argued that 
calculating monthly disposable income for purposes of the means test months or 
even years after the initial Chapter 13 bankruptcy filing can lead to absurd results, 
yet they have struggled with how to fit this view into contrary language in the Bank-
ruptcy Code. For example, several of the courts adopting the minority view admit-
ted that their interpretation of the conversion issue is at odds with § 704(b) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, which requires the United States Trustee to give notice of the 
presumption of abuse to creditors within ten days of the first creditors’ meeting (not 
within ten days of the date of filing of the petition).301 These courts have 
                                                          
 299. 11 U.S.C. § 342(d) (2012). 
 300. In re Kerr, 2007 WL 2119291, at *5–6 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. July 18, 2007). 
 301. In re Dudley, 405 B.R. at 797–98. 
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acknowledged that their reliance on § 342(d) to bolster their argument that the 
Bankruptcy Code contemplates no application of the means test in converted cases 
conflicts with the language of section 704(b). They concluded, however, that this 
interpretation has led to fewer statutory conflicts on the conversion issue than the 
majority view. 
Because either approach conflicts with longstanding provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, it is imperative on Congress to act to resolve the issue. This article 
adopts the view that the means test should apply in cases converted from Chapter 
13 to Chapter 7, providing both statutory and policy justifications for its position. 
This article also details how Congress should amend the Bankruptcy Code, both to 
adopt this position and to eliminate difficult issues of statutory interpretation that 
courts have been forced to grapple with since the enactment of BAPCPA nearly 15 
years ago. 
A. Statutory Arguments Favoring Application of the Means 
Test in Converted Cases 
Until Congress amends the Bankruptcy Code to make it clear that the means 
test applies in converted cases, courts should adopt the view espoused by the Per-
fetto line of cases that the means test applies in converted cases.302 Two statutory 
reasons strongly suggest that this view is a better reading of § 707(b) and the Bank-
ruptcy Code than the view adopted by the court in Fox and its progeny. 
The most compelling reason for applying the means test in converted cases is 
that, prior to BAPCPA, courts nearly uniformly applied § 707(b)’s other provisions 
to converted cases. Section 707(b)(1)’s language at issue, “filed by a debtor under 
this chapter,” existed prior to BAPCPA,303 and BAPCPA did not change this lan-
guage. Case law applying § 707(b)’s other provisions in a variety of converted cases 
prior to BAPCPA304 strongly suggests that the means test should apply to converted 
cases. Courts interpreting § 1328(f)’s “filed under Chapter 7” language similar to 
that of § 707(b) have also uniformly applied it to converted cases.305 Moreover, 
courts adopting the minority view ignore both lines of case law and, as a result, 
create a substantial interpretive flaw in their reasoning: determining that the means 
test does not apply in converted cases because of § 707(b)(1)’s “filed by a debtor 
under this chapter” language necessarily means that all of § 707(b) does not apply 
to converted cases. 
While no court adopting the view that the means test does not apply in con-
verted cases has directly held that § 707(b) is inapplicable to converted cases, one 
scholar has suggested that it would not apply.306 Denying application of § 707(b) to 
converted cases is inconsistent with case law across the United States applying it to 
converted cases prior to BAPCPA.307 Additionally, refusing to apply the means test 
and § 707(b) generally to converted cases deprives the court, the United States Trus-
tee, the trustee, and any parties in interest from filing a motion to dismiss for                                                           
 302. See supra notes 128–237 and accompanying text. 
 303. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1998). 
 304. See cases cited supra note 149. 
 305. See cases cited supra note 204. 
 306. Brunstad, supra note 27 (arguing “[T]he conclusion that means testing does not apply to cases 
converted from chapter 11 or 13 to chapter 7 is perfectly rational and may be constitutionally required.”). 
 307. See cases cited supra note 204. 
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substantial abuse.308 Preventing these players from raising the issue of whether the 
debtor’s filing constitutes substantial abuse weakens the entire bankruptcy system 
by allowing converted debtors to avoid the investigative eyes of all parties with 
knowledge of the debtor’s bankruptcy proceeding. Additionally, circumventing § 
707(b) in converted cases takes away the means test as a potential tool that Congress 
intended courts to have in determining whether a debtor’s case is abusive.309 Over-
all, applying § 707(b) is consistent with pre-BAPCPA case law construing “filed by 
a debtor under this chapter” and avoids preventing application of § 707(b) in its 
entirety in converted cases. 
Second, the plain language of § 348(a) and case law in a variety of contexts 
construing it pre- and post-BAPCPA strongly suggest that a case converted to Chap-
ter 7 is deemed filed under the destination chapter. As the Perfetto, Kerr, and Willis 
courts point out, courts adopting the view that the means test does not apply in con-
verted cases inadequately address the body of case law finding that conversion 
causes a case to be deemed filed under the destination chapter.310 Section 348(a) 
provides that conversion of a case “constitutes an order for relief” under the desti-
nation chapter, but otherwise does not change the petition date, the date a case is 
commenced, and the date of the order for relief.311 Sections 348(b) and 348(c) spec-
ify when the conversion order changes the date of the order for relief only under 
certain sections of the Bankruptcy Code, and § 707(b) is not among them.312 Oth-
erwise, a case is deemed filed under the destination chapter. Courts adopting the 
view that the means test does not apply in converted cases read § 348 too expan-
sively by arguing that the exclusion of § 707 from § 348(b) means that a case is not 
deemed filed under Chapter 7. Section 348(b) merely changes the date of the order 
for relief to the date of the conversion order. Therefore, courts holding the view that 
the means test applies in converted cases properly interpret § 348. 
B.  Policy Justifications Favoring Application of the Means 
Test in Converted Cases 
Not only does a nuanced reading of the Bankruptcy Code support the conclu-
sion that the means test should apply to cases converted to Chapter 7 from other 
chapters, but three principal policy justifications support this position as well. If the 
means test is part of the Bankruptcy Code, it should apply to all Chapter 7 debtors 
except for those that Congress expressly excluded.313 Three principal reasons war-
rant application of the means test in converted cases. 
First, refusing to apply the means test and § 707(b) in converted cases creates 
a loophole in the Bankruptcy Code. For example, a debtor with sufficient disposable 
income to repay at least a portion of his or her unsecured debt may file a Chapter 
                                                          
 308. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-8). 
 309. Gebhardt v. Pollitzer, 860 F.3d 1334, 1339 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 310. See cases cited supra note 204. So, it appears to be well settled that when they do convert, debtors 
are deemed to have “filed under” the converted to chapter, as of the date the original petition was filed. 
See also Resendez v. Lindquist, 691 F.2d 397, 398–99 (8th Cir. 1982). 
 311. 11 U.S.C. § 348(a) (2012). 
 312. 11 U.S.C. §§ 348(b), (c) (listing §§ 342, 365(d), 727(a)(10), 727(b), 1102(a), 1110(a)(1), 1121(b), 
1121(c), 1141(d), 1201(a), 1221, 1228(a), 1301(a), and 1305(a)). 
 313. It is noteworthy that Congress did not explicitly exclude converted debtors in its list of debtors 
who were excluded from the means test. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(D). 
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13 petition and then immediately convert to Chapter 7 to obtain a quick discharge 
and avoid the means test and the ire of § 707(b). Although courts adopting the view 
that the means test does not apply to converted cases quickly dismiss this possibil-
ity, one case adopting this view actually allowed a debtor to use the loophole in this 
manner. In In re Dudley, the court allowed debtors to convert to Chapter 7 two 
months after filing a Chapter 13 petition and avoid the means test even though they 
would have had approximately $2,000 of disposable income each month under the 
means test to pay their unsecured creditors more than $120,000 over 60 months.314 
The Dudley case is simply one published opinion documenting how debtors 
take advantage of a loophole created by the view that the means test does not apply 
in converted cases. While some cases holding that the means test does not apply in 
converted cases may have involved debtors more sympathetic than the Dudleys, 
including debtors who had recently lost their jobs after making plan payments for 
at least a year,315 courts should not adopt a view that allows debtors to abuse the 
bankruptcy system. Additionally, while Congress intended for a debtor who was 
unsuccessful in a Chapter 13 case to be able to convert to Chapter 7 if the debtor 
was eligible under the destination chapter,316 the Supreme Court made clear in Mar-
rama that this is not an unfettered right. A debtor’s bad faith conversion may cause 
him or her to forfeit the right to convert.317 A holding that the means test applies in 
converted cases will prohibit debtors from exploiting the loophole, which is entirely 
consistent with Marrama. 
Second, courts adopting the minority view and some scholars have theorized 
that if courts apply the means test to converted cases, it may create a “phantom 
debtor” problem.318 Phantom debtors are theoretical debtors who initially file a 
Chapter 13 case and convert to Chapter 7, but fail the means test and thus cannot 
continue in Chapter 7.319 Phantom debtors would be left with no ability to avail 
themselves of the bankruptcy system. However, courts have repeatedly held that 
there is no constitutional right to file for bankruptcy protection.320 There are some 
individuals who simply do not qualify for bankruptcy, and failing to apply provi-
sions of the Code to remedy the problem is not an adequate solution. 
Moreover, phantom debtors rarely materialize in practice. A debtor who is un-
able to make plan payments in a Chapter 13 but still has enough income to raise the 
presumption of abuse in Chapter 7 is unlikely to exist because a debtor can propose 
a reduction in the amount of his or her plan payments by showing a sufficient 
change in circumstances under § 1329(a).321 In some districts, a debtor may even 
propose a plan payment that will pay unsecured creditors a 0% dividend.322 
                                                          
 314. 405 B.R. 790, 791–92 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2013). 
 315. In re Layton, 480 B.R. 392, 399 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012). 
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 320. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446 (1973) (“There is no constitutional right to obtain a 
discharge of one’s debts in bankruptcy.”); Thomas Kelch, The Mythology of Waivers of Bankruptcy 
Privileges, 31 IND. L. REV. 897, 900 (1998) (“Not only is there no constitutional right to file bankruptcy, 
but Congress need not even create a bankruptcy law.”). 
 321. 11 U.S.C. § 1329(a) (2012). 
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Finally, while not perfect, the means test and § 707(b) contain several release 
valves that prevent absurd results from occurring. First, courts do not have to dis-
miss or convert case if a debtor fails to rebut the presumption of abuse.323 Second, 
under § 707(b)(1) the court, the United States Trustee, the Chapter 7 trustee, and 
parties in interest have discretion in deciding to bring a motion to dismiss for sub-
stantial abuse.324 Thus, courts have the statutory authority to prevent unjust results 
when applying the means test in converted cases, at least until Congress acts to 
address the issue in a more comprehensive way. The next subsection identifies the 
key interpretive problems that courts face in holding that the means test applies in 
converted cases and examines how courts can minimize their negative effects until 
Congress acts. 
C.  Interpretive Problems with Holding that the Means Test 
Applies in Converted Cases 
Courts adopting the view that the means test applies in converted cases cause 
two main interpretive problems. First, determining that the means test applies in 
converted cases renders § 342(d) virtually impossible to enforce. Section 342(d) 
requires the following: 
In a case under [C]hapter 7 of this title in which the debtor is an individual 
and in which the presumption of abuse arises under [§] 707(b), the clerk 
shall give written notice to all creditors not later than 10 days after the date 
of the filing of the petition that the presumption of abuse has arisen. 
Unfortunately, some courts adopting this view raise and dismiss the discrepancy as 
a sloppy drafting problem.325 No court has construed how the time limit in § 342(d) 
should apply in converted cases. It is likely that courts adopting this view generally 
have not had to deal with this issue because, by holding that the means test applies 
in converted cases, they inevitably dismiss cases in which a debtor cannot rebut the 
presumption of abuse even though the clerk did not provide timely notice. Never-
theless, clerks should not be put in this untenable position until Congress amends 
the Bankruptcy Code. Courts should continue to apply the means test in converted 
cases and explicitly provide that a clerk need not timely comply with § 342(d). 
The second and chief interpretive problem with applying the means test in con-
verted cases is that debtors must use a calculation of “current monthly income” from 
six months prior to their original petition date, and not the date of conversion. Es-
pecially in cases where debtors convert to Chapter 7 after more than a year in Chap-
ter 13, it seems unfair to require them to use old income figures for determining 
substantial abuse. However, debtors may explain the special circumstances sur-
rounding their conversions when completing the means test.326 While adequately 
explaining the special circumstances and the totality of the debtor’s financial                                                           
test applies in converted cases when debtors have a clear ability to repay a portion of their unsecured 
debts. 
 323. See In re Mravik, 399 B.R. 202, 210 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2008); but see In re Woodruff, 416 B.R. 
369, 374 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2009). 
 324. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(4) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-8). 
 325. In re Kerr, 2007 WL 2119291, at *4 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. July 18, 2007). 
 326. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i). 
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situation is the best way for debtors to avoid being dismissed from Chapter 7, courts 
vary widely in what factors constitute special circumstances and create inconsistent 
results.327 Yet, combined with § 707(b)’s other release valves, the means test’s spe-
cial circumstances provision is the best tool for a court to use to avoid unfair results 
until Congress amends the Bankruptcy Code to address how courts should calculate 
a converted debtor’s current monthly income in cases of conversion. 
D.  The Final Frontier: Congress Must Amend the Bank-
ruptcy Code to Resolve Inconsistencies 
If the means test is going to remain in the Bankruptcy Code,328 Congress should 
step in and amend the Bankruptcy Code to clearly indicate that the means test ap-
plies in a case converted from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7. The first step in resolving 
this issue would be for Congress to amend § 707(b)(1). As amended, the statute 
would read as follows: 
(b)(1) After notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion or on a mo-
tion by the United States trustee, trustee (or bankruptcy administrator, if 
any), or any party in interest, may dismiss a case initially filed by an indi-
vidual debtor under this chapter or a case converted by an individual 
debtor to this chapter whose debts are primarily consumer debts. . . . 
Adding the above language would clarify that the means test applies to cases 
converted by an individual debtor. In addition, this language promotes § 707(b)’s 
longstanding history of being a potent tool for preventing abusive filings and fur-
thers BAPCPA’s goal of ensuring that debtors who can pay a substantial portion of 
their debts do so in Chapter 13.329 
In addition to amending § 707(b), Congress must make several conforming 
amendments to eliminate internal statutory conflict within the Bankruptcy Code. 
First, Congress should amend § 342(d) to clarify that the clerk has ten days after the 
conversion date to give notice to all creditors that the presumption of abuse has 
arisen. Thus, § 342(d) should read as follows: 
(d) In a case under [C]hapter 7 of this title in which the debtor is an indi-
vidual and in which the presumption of abuse arises under [§] 707(b), the 
clerk shall give written notice to all creditors not later than 10 days after 
                                                          
 327. See, e.g., In re Delbecq, 368 B.R. 754, 759 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2007) (student loan debt is sufficient 
“special circumstance” to rebut presumption of abuse); but see In re Maura, 491 B.R. 493, 512 (Bankr. 
E.D. Mich. 2013) (student loan payments were not “special circumstance” of kind required to rebut 
means test presumption); In re Champagne, 389 B.R. 191, 200 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2008) (non-dischargeable 
student loan does not per se constitute “special circumstance”). 
 328. Congress may eliminate the means test if it amends the Bankruptcy Code. The means test and 
BAPCPA, as a whole, have been the subject of significant criticism from courts as this article demon-
strates because of the interpretive problems that it caused. Scholars have also been critical of BAPCPA 
and the means test because of the interpretive problems and effects on individual debtors that it caused. 
See WARREN ET AL., supra note 17, at 154; Bruce M. Price & Terry Dalton, From Downhill to Slalom: 
An Empirical Analysis of the Effectiveness of BAPCPA (and Some Unintended Consequences), 26 YALE 
L. & POL’Y REV. 135 (2007) (detailing the negative consequences of BAPCPA’s enactment for individ-
ual debtors). 
 329. Pollitzer v. Gebhardt, 860 F.3d 1334, 1339 (11th Cir. 2017). 
33
Pratt et al.: Harmonizing Conversion and the Means Test in Bankruptcy
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2019
Iss. 1] Pratt, Graves & Cecil: Harmonizing Conversion 69 
the date of the filing of the petition or in a case converted to [C]hapter 7, 
the date of the conversion order, that the presumption of abuse has arisen. 
This addition eliminates the statutory contradiction caused by adopting the 
view that the means test applies in converted cases. It also prevents the risk that a 
clerk would be put in the untenable position of technically violating § 342(d) in 
every converted case in which the debtor satisfies the means test. 
Finally, to make the means test calculation fairer to debtors and to further § 
707(b)’s purpose of being a potent tool for curbing abusive filings, Congress should 
amend § 707(b)(2)(A)(i) to provide an alternate six-month period for current 
monthly income calculation purposes for cases converted Chapter 7 one year after 
the petition date. As amended, § 707(b)(2)(A)(i) would read as follows: 
(2)(A)(i) In considering under paragraph (1) whether the granting of relief 
would be an abuse of the provisions of this chapter, the court shall presume 
abuse exists if the debtor’s current monthly income, or if the debtor’s case 
is converted to [C]hapter 7 from another chapter more than one year after 
the petition date, a calculation of current monthly income using the six-
month period immediately preceding conversion, reduced by the amounts 
determined under clauses (ii), (iii), and (iv), and multiplied by 60. . . . 
By providing an alternate six-month window for  current monthly income, Con-
gress would allow the means test calculation to be determined using an income fig-
ure that parallels the calculation of the means test in cases initially filed under Chap-
ter 7. Thus, the six-month window prior to conversion in a case that was initially 
filed more than a year earlier, allows the debtor to utilize more recent income for 
the purposes of the means test. As a result, if a debtor lost his or her job or received 
a reduction in pay, the means test would account for that. 
Limiting the new six-month period to cases converted more than a year after 
the original petition date would make it less likely that debtors are using conversion 
as a mechanism to manipulate the means test. Nevertheless, creating a second cur-
rent monthly income, six-month window could potentially allow debtors to time 
their conversions to periods in which they have artificially low incomes. A court 
could prevent this from happening by employing its authority under § 707(b)(3) to 
consider whether a debtor’s case is filed in bad faith and by looking at the totality 
of the debtor’s financial circumstance.330 Additionally, the court could use its equi-
table power under § 105(a), in light of Marrama,331 to prevent a debtor from con-
verting to Chapter 7 or it could rely on its inherent power as a federal court to pre-
vent abusive litigation tactics.332 
Overall, by amending theses three sections of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress 
can resolve the thorny issue of whether the means test applies in converted cases 
from another bankruptcy chapter to Chapter 7. Resolution of this issue by statute 
frees courts to focus their attention on other interpretive issues. 
                                                          
 330. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3). 
 331. Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 375–76 (2007). 
 332. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012); Marrama, 549 U.S. at 375–76. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Determining whether the means test applies in cases converted from Chapter 
13 to Chapter 7 has divided courts across the United States and has even caused 
bankruptcy judges within the same district court to disagree.333 While in the nearly 
15 years since BAPCPA’s enactment a majority of courts have held that the means 
test applies in converted cases, a considerable minority view has emerged. Unfor-
tunately, both the majority and minority views cause interpretive problems because 
both conflict with at least one section of the Bankruptcy Code. 
By summarizing the key cases adopting both views, this article argues that the 
means test should apply in converted cases, and, while imperfect, courts should 
continue adopting the majority view until Congress amends the Bankruptcy Code. 
This view promotes a better reading of § 707(b) and the Bankruptcy Code in general 
and prevents debtors from manipulating the bankruptcy system by filing under 
Chapter 13 and then converting to Chapter 7 to avoid the means test. Additionally, 
this article lays out language that Congress should adopt in amending the Bank-
ruptcy Code to codify the view that the means test applies in converted cases. By 
adopting these amendments, Congress can harmonize two central components of 
the bankruptcy process—conversion and the means test. 
                                                          
 333. See cases cited supra note 22. 
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